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Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and
an Empirical Study
Theodore Eisenberg*

The Supreme Court's treatment of official liability is under attack.
Some believe that decisions interpreting the centerpiece of the official
liability system-section 1983 '-have been too protective of government
officials and entities. 2 Others argue that the Court has overexposed governments or officials to liability.3 Still others detect difficulty in the area
without pronouncing whether the Court has gone too far or not far
enough. 4 The Court itself regularly divides over issues concerning the
scope of section 1983. 5
To some degree this tension is unavoidable. Several factors combine to ensure that the course of modern civil rights doctrine will not be
*
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1
Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
2 E.g., Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Ofjiers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1174-84, 1188
(1981) (decisions too protective of governmental entities); Freed, Executive OjiialImmunityfor
Constitutional Violations. An Analysis anda Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526 (1977) (decisions too
protective of both government officials and governmental entities); Schuck, Suing Our Servants.
The Court, Congress, andthe Liability of Public Oicialsfor Damages, 1980 SuP. Cr. REv. 281, 286
(decisions too protective of governmental entities).
3 E.g., Cass,supra note 2, at 1153-74, 1187 (too much opportunity for adversely affecting official behavior); Schuck, supra note 2, at 285 (individual officials too vulnerable to
liability).
4 E.g., Bermann, Integrating Governmentaland Offter Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
1175 (1977); Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Ofjiers: PropertyRights and OftialAccountability, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 8 (1978). For the view that the Court has dealt with the
problem as well as may be expected, see Jaron, The Threat of PersonalLiability Under the Federal
Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URBAN
LAw. 1 (1981).

5 E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (5-4 decision); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (5-4 decision); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (5-3
decision).
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smooth. Rapid expansion of constitutional guarantees inevitably strains
a provision that associates a private damages action with each new constitutional right. Section 1983's coverage of state officials places it in the
middle of the continuing clash over the proper powers of the state and
federal governments. And Congress has provided the Court with virtually no assistance on section 1983 issues. Indeed, Congress's nineteenth
century "technical" tinkering with what is now section 1983 generated
6
problems that the Court only recently has faced.
If the Court's section 1983 decisions are not entirely to blame for
difficulties that attend the section, they are not free from fault. Since its
7
early important interpretations of section 1983 in Tenney v. Brandhove
and Monroe v. Pape,8 the Court has provided incomplete, weakly reasoned, or otherwise questionable opinions. At a general level, the Court
has not acknowledged that there are at least two competing visions of
section 1983. In one perspective, section 1983 addresses a limited historical problem in post-Civil War race relations. In another, it is the primary civil mechanism for vindicating all constitutional rights. These
two visions do not always lead to consistent results. At the doctrinal
level, Tenney initiated a pattern of mechanical invocation of pre-section
1983 immunity doctrine in section 1983 cases without considering the
historical and political circumstances that differentiate official liability
under section 1983 from prior patterns of official liability. Monroe tortured section 1983's legislative history so severely that the section has yet
to recover.
Past weaknesses in the Court's treatment of section 1983 cases, however, may pale in comparison to present weaknesses in the Court's understanding. Its decisions to date suggest an inadequate grasp of the
past; some current Justices' premises reflect an incomplete understanding of the present. Recent opinions and other writings suggest that some
Justices wish both to limit the number of section 1983 cases and to direct
as many of them as possible to state courts. 9 Much of the impetus underlying this trend comes from a widespread perception that section
1983 cases are overwhelming the federal courts.
This Article addresses both past and present weaknesses in the
Court's section 1983 jurisprudence. Part I focuses on the Court's past,
direct contributions to confusion about section 1983. It is a limited endeavor, emphasizing how section 1983 doctrine arrived at its current
state rather than how an ideal law of official liability should read. Iden6 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983 covers actions based on federal
statutes, a coverage added to § 1983 in 1874); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600 (1979) (assessing scope of§ 1983's jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)
(Supp. IV 1980), from which it was separated in 1874).
7 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

8 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
9

See notes 164-65 and accompanying text inra.
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tifiable weaknesses in current section 1983 doctrine have limited the
scope of section 1983 analysis, and have caused the Court and some of
its critics to ignore relevant factors and to consider too narrow a range of
choices in section 1983 decisionmaking. Tracing the sources of these
weaknesses is an important first step toward rethinking the federal civil
rights program.
Part II examines the present realities of section 1983 litigation, discussing the results of an empirical study that I conducted of all section
1983 cases filed over a two year period in the Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles. To the extent that the Court bases
decisions on perceptions about section 1983's operation, it should have
an accurate picture of how the section works. If my study of section 1983
cases reflects the national experience, the Court and many commentators share false impressions about the nature and burden of section 1983
litigation. For example, section 1983 cases are not overwhelming the
federal courts; trivial claims, involving little if any federal policy, do not
dominate district court dockets, and courts are not, at the behest of state
prisoners, eagerly overseeing minute details of prison life. The results of
the study do suggest that real problems exist in section 1983 litigation.
But they are not of a kind that warrant restricting either section 1983 or
the Constitution.
I
THE SOURCES OF CONFUSION IN SECTION

A.

1983

DOCTRINE

Competing Conceptions of Section 1983

For the purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to set out two plausible visions of how section 1983 might work. The two visions by no
means exhaust the universe of possible views of section 1983-they are
offered here merely as reference points. An ideal approach to section
1983 might employ features of both views or some completely different
view. Nevertheless, developing a framework against which to assess recent section 1983 cases is warranted, particularly because some of the
case-law tensions noted below may be seen as manifestations of these
competing visions of section 1983.
The first vision of section 1983, which I will call "historical," draws
heavily on the social forces that generated its original enactment. Section 1983 was first enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which attempted to deal with widespread legal abuses and physical violence, often backed by the Ku Klux Klan, against Southern Blacks and
their white supporters. Representative Perry eloquently summarized
the problem that Congress addressed:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear
not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act
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as if they might be accomplices. In the presence of these gangs all the
apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes ofjustice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared
detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do
is to appeal to justice. Of the uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is credibly stated that not one has
been punished.' 0
Against this background, the 1871 Act provided in section 1 (now
section 1983) for civil actions against those who under color of state law
deprived persons of their constitutional rights. 1 Section 2 of the Act
consisted of two sentences of complexity and length that would do a
modern Internal Revenue Code draftsman proud. It provided for civil
and criminal sanctions against public and private conspiracies to: (1)
challenge federal authority, (2) deprive persons "of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws," or (3)
prevent states from protecting persons against deprivations of their
rights.12 Sections 3 and 4 authorized the use of federal force to redress a
state's inability or unwillingness to deal with Klan or other violence.
Among other things, sections 3 and 4 also deemed state complicity with
anti-federal combinations to be "rebellion against the government of the
United States," with a resulting suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.13 The Act was strong medicine.
The historical vision supports two principal conclusions. First, the
entire Act of which section 1983 was a part addressed an enormously
important, but nevertheless limited, problem. Racial attitudes in the
South, blossoming in the form of Klan and other violence, and the failure of the states to cope with that violence, prompted its enactment.
Any application of section 1983 beyond the confines of racial problems
must seek justification in something more than the intent of section
1983's framers. A case may be made for such extensions, but they are
beyond the core concerns underlying section 1983's enactment.
Second, although the 1871 Act dealt with a limited problem, its
history suggests a firm congressional resolve that the problem feel the
full effect of federal power, without regard to traditional limitations.
The problem manifested itself at all levels of society and in all official
circles; no traditional remedy would have sufficed. The 1871 Act penetrated the problem as deeply as Congress knew how to penetrate any
problem by legislation. Traditional immunities, respect for states, and
other basic assumptions were minimized in Congress's eagerness to deal
with the problem in the South. 14 Thus, the historical perspective also
10
11
12
13
14

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, app. at 78 (1871).
Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
Id. § 2.
Id. §§ 3-4.
See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
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suggests that those who would limit section 1983's ability to protect the
rights it was meant to protect must seek justification in something other
than the intent of section 1983's drafters.
To illustrate, from this historical perspective one may question the
Court's suggestion in Quern v. Jordan15 that section 1983 left unaffected
the immunity of states from suit because Congress would not have
lightly overturned such a tradition. Not only did the misbehavior of
states play a prominent role in prompting enactment of section 1983
but, in the same act, Congress was willing to deem state complicity with
the Klan to be "rebellion against the government of the United States"
16
and to back that declaration with authorization to use federal force.
What more can Congress do to a state? By comparison, civil liability for
states, which section 1983 literally encompasses, is child's play. To say
that the 1871 Congress would have thought twice about the federalism
implications of civil liability for states is to scorn reality.
In contrast to the historical approach, one may view section 1983 as
the general federal remedy for violations of all constitutional rights.
The Court has toyed with intermediate approaches under which section
1983 protects only "civil" rights 17 or only "personal" rights, 18 but these
never have come to represent a coherent approach to the section. If not
confined by its origins, section 1983 seems destined to protect all constitutional rights. There is little startling about having such a remedy. We
think nothing of remedying private wrongs through tort law. Vindicating constitutional rights through a federal cause of action seems a mild
step. Under this view, if section 1983 did not exist, we would have had
to invent it. And in the one crucial area to which section 1983 does not
reach-actions against federal officials-the Supreme Court's decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics t9
constituted just such an invention.
This second approach to section 1983, which I will call "functional," raises important questions about the depth to which section
1983 will penetrate the expanded set of rights that it is viewed as covering. The historical approach yields a narrow set of rights as the focus of
440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979).
Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 4, 17 Stat. 13.
17
Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900). See also Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475, 485 (1903) (suggesting possible distinction between § 1983's coverage of actions under
authority of state constitutions and actions under authority of inferior sources of state law).
18 Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 531-32 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (limiting scope
of§ 1983's jurisdictional counterpart to nonproperty rights). But cf. Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972) (rejecting Justice Stone's approach). In Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 534 (1981), the Court refused to limit § 1983 to misbehavior by defendants with a
culpable state of mind, thus probably precluding limiting § 1983 to cases of egregious
misbehavior.
19 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Bivens Court found a § 1983-type action to be inherent in
the Constitution.
15

16
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section 1983, but it offers a plausible basis for claiming that the section
mercilessly penetrates abridgments of those rights. The functional approach expands section 19 83's scope to cover all constitutional rights,
but can it do so without a loss of the depth to which section 1983 may
reach in protecting those rights? Perhaps more importantly, may section 1983 be given a broad functional scope, applied to many rights,
without losing penetration within its core area of historical concern?
Examining Quern v.Jordan again, once section 1983. is viewed as encompassing all constitutional rights, it becomes more plausible for the
Court to announce that section 1983 does not upset traditional state
privileges. The nation has never had the depth of commitment to vindicating all constitutional rights that the 1871 Congress had to vindicating
an important subcategory of those rights. Quern also demonstrates that
rules announced in one section 1983 case, in this case a rule against suing states, may be stated with sufficient generality to limit recoveries in
cases closer to section 1983's core historical concerns.
B.

Tensions in the Case Law

By any standard, there are difficulties with the Court's law of public liability. Too much time has passed for the Court to rest much claim
to legitimacy on the will of the Reconstruction Congresses that enacted
and modified section 1983.20 And the significant gap separating the
desires of those Congresses from the Court's results would compromise
any such claim. 21 Nor can the Court find refuge by claiming to implement modern policy considerations. Its section 1983 jurisprudence exposes many officials and entities to liability without achieving either full
compensation for victims of unlawful behavior or effective deterrence of
misbehaving public officials.2 2 Instead, the Court is operating at the
more mundane level of trying to keep its cases from conflicting with
each other.
Municipal immunity cases are among the most visible instances of
doctrinal confusion. In 1961, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape23
held that Congress had not meant to render municipalities liable under
section 1983. In 1973, the Court seemed committed to this path when it
held that even if state law allowed an action against a city, the action
could not be brought under section 1983.24 Yet by 1978, Monell v. De-

partment of Social SerVices 25 held that Monroe was wrong; Congress had
20 Section 1983 originally was § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 17 Stat. 13.
21 See text accompanying notes 15-17 suzpra, 29-31 infira.
22 See Cass, supra note 2, at 1187-88; Schuck, supra note 2, at 285, 339-45.
23 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
24 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973). Soon after Moor, City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) extended Monroe's ban on suits against cities to include requests for injunctive relief. Id. at 511-13.
25 436 U.S. 658, 665, 688-89 (1978).
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meant to subject cities to suit. In 1980, with all the fervor of a new
convert, the Court held in Owen v. City of Independence26 that cities may
not rely on the good faith defense available to individual officials. Lest
cities seem too vulnerable, however, City ofNewport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.27
held them immune from punitive damage awards. The Court claimed
to ground each of these results in part on congressional will and history.
That same will and history has enabled the Court to draw some
questionable lines in the area of state liability as well. The first line
distinguishes the immunity of cities from that of states. The factors that
have caused the Court to interpret section 1983 as having substantially
changed municipal liability have played no role in determining the liability of states. In Quem v. Jordan,28 the Court held that section 1983 will
not support an award of damages against states because Congress could
not have meant to change a doctrine as well established as a state's eleventh amendment immunity without a more explicit expression. Yet
nothing in the statute or its history suggests such a distinction between
its treatment of cities and states.
States are not totally insulated from section 1983 suits, however, for
the Court has also drawn a line between damages awards against states
and awards of attorneys' fees. Since Hutto v. Finney,29 states have been
liable for attorneys' fees in section 1983 cases. Thus, an individual may
suffer grievous damages from constitutional misbehavior by a state; yet
in an ensuing lawsuit for injunctive relief against the responsible state
officials, the state's sovereignty, which precludes an award of damages
against it, can be invaded by an order to pay the plaintiff's lawyer.
Again, the Court tells us, this is simply Congress's will combined with
30
the effect of the eleventh amendment.
The Court's individual immunity decisions have been less directly
self-contradictory than its entity immunity decisions. Serious problems
still exist, however, both with the Court's individual immunity decisions
in the aggregate and with particular decisions. A hypothetical situation
resembling the problems that prompted the enactment of section 1983
illustrates the difficulties on the aggregate level. Assume that in the
1870s a southern legislature, in defiance of the fourteenth amendment,
enacts a criminal law that discriminates against Blacks. A state prosecutor charges a Black person with violating the law, knowing it to be unconstitutional. A state judge, who also knows better, sustains the statute
and sentences the defendant to prison. Under prevailing section 1983
doctrine, legislators, judges, and prosecutors are absolutely immune
26

27
28
29
30

445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
453 U.S. 247, 258-71 (1981).
440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979).
437 U.S. 678 (1978).
Id. at 696-98.

SECTION 1983
from Suit. 3 1 The victim has a cause of action only against a state officer
who may have arrested him, and even this defendant may invoke a good
faith defense.3 2 If, upon learning of the indictment, the person surrendered himself to the authorities (relying on his day in court for vindication), there would be no arresting officer and, therefore, no individual
amenable to suit for whatever damages the statute, wrongful trial, and
incarceration caused. On such facts, Congress must have meant section
1983 to provide greater relief.
If one shifts from the immunity system in the aggregate and examines one of its component parts, the picture does not brighten. One legislative immunity case, Lake County Estates,Inc. v. Tahoe RegionalPlanning
Ageny, 33 threatens to allow legislative immunity to reach beyond its
traditional boundaries and immunize a broad range of previously vulnerable official executive conduct. Similar problems infect the areas of
34
judicial and prosecutorial immunity.
In legislative immunity cases, as in all cases that grant absolute immunity, the Court attempts to ground its holding in sound public policy. Defendants are immune, the Court tells us, because it is a good idea
that they be so. 3 5 Courageous legislative decisionmaking requires an atmosphere uncomplicated by threats of personal liability.
The need for courageous public decisionmakers has a strong appeal-too strong. The argument undercuts much of the rest of the
Court's public liability doctrine. Society needs fearless executive officials as much as it needs fearless judges and legislators. Yet executive
officials enjoy no absolute immunity, and even well-intentioned behavior can lead to liability.3 6 And if the possibility of being sued is viewed
as too inhibiting for judges and legislators, surely potential criminal liability, which the Court has said survives, 37 raises serious questions. Lake
Count9 , Estates and other decisions highlight an essential problem in the
Court's individual immunity doctrine: as a matter of policy, it is difficult
to support immunity for one class of public officials and not another.
The alternative, however, is to render all officials liable or no officials
liable. The Court clearly will not choose the former course and the latter would make section 1983 meaningless.
The Court has generated other questionable results. Shortly after
31 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-28 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553-55 & n.9 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-79 (1951)
(legislators).
32
See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975).
33 440 U.S. 391,402-06 (1979) (members of regional, interstate planning agency entitled
to legislative immunity while acting in legislative capacity).
34 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
35
See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
36 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public school officials).
37 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,429
(1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974).
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Maine v. Thiboutot38 held that "the plain language of the statute" pre39
cludes limiting section 1983's coverage to some subset of federal laws,
40
the Court decided two cases that suggested precisely such a limitation.
The Court also seems confused about the relationship between section
1983 and state law. On occasion it feels bound to apply state law to
issues not expressly addressed by section 1983.41 More frequently, however, it invents a federal rule to fill such gaps. 42 The Court seems blissfully unaware of its divergent practices. 43 State law remedies play a
particularly confusing role. Sometimes, possible state law remedies are
deemed not to influence the availability or scope of the federal remedy
under section 1983. 44 Yet in other cases, the Court constructs significant
barriers to effective federal relief on the premise that state law provides
effective remedies. 45
The doctrinal disarray attending section 1983 transcends mere attitudes towards civil rights cases. The disarray does not necessarily imply
that the Court is straining to undermine the federal civil rights program.
Some flaws favor civil rights plaintiffs while others favor their likely
targets. To identify some of the sources of the current confusion, it is
38 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
39 In Thiboutot, the question before the Court was "whether the phrase 'and laws,' as
used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws."
Id. at 4. Implicitly concluding that it should not be so limited, the Court stated: "Given that
Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute embraces
respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act." Id. After Thiboutot, it
was reasonable to assume that § 1983 encompassed all federal statutory claims. See Municipal
Liabiliy Under 42 US C § 1983: Hearings on S 584, S 585, andS 990 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 329 (1981) (statement of
Prof. Brown) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];id. at 344 (statement of Mr. Madden); id. at 37071 (statement of Sen. Curran); Schuck,supra note 2, at 284. But see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 237 (Supp. 1981) (raising questions about the scope of Thiboutot); T. EISENBERG,
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 779, 829, 885 (1981) (same).

40 In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court, relying on Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Thiboutot, indicated that § 1983 would not provide a cause of action where a statute provides an exclusive remedy. Id. at 28. The Court in
Halderman remanded the case in part for a determination of whether remedies contained in
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act were meant to be exclusive.
Id. at 30. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
19-21 (1981), the Court went one step further and found that certain environmental laws
were meant to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.
41
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (relying in part on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988); Robertson v. Wegmann, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
42 See Eisenberg, State Law in FederalCivil Rights Cases: The ProperScope ofSection 1988,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 510-11 (1980).
43
For a discussion of the Court's difficulty with this aspect of the role of state law in
§ 1983 cases, see generally Eisenberg, supra note 42.
44 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); f. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (non-§ 1983 action against
federal officials).
45 E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537
(1981) (availability of state remedies determines whether due process violations occurred).

1982]

SECTION 1983

helpful to look closely at the Court's reasoning in the opinions that set
the tone for subsequent analysis. Most of the important attitudes and
techniques that contribute to the current disorder are traceable to the
Court's relatively early decisions in Monroe v. Pape4 6 and Tenney v.
Brandhove.47

C.

Tenney v. Brandhove

It is common to view Monroe v. Pape, which freed section 1983 of
possible restrictive interpretations, as the modern foundation for section
1983 analysis. But ten years before Monroe, Tenney v. Brandhove initiated
trends in section 1983 analysis that have been as influential as Monroe
itself. Just as Monroe assured plaintiffs a cause of action for constitutional violations, Tenney laid the groundwork for assuring that actual
recoveries in section 1983 cases would be relatively rare events. Taken
together, Tenney and Monroe supply a prism through which one can analyze nearly the entire corpus of section 1983 doctrine. The decisions reveal the origins of the interwoven strands that constitute the modern law
of constitutional remedy, as well as the sources of many of that law's
problems. The opinions also outline the Court's overall approach to section 1983; they are implicit statements about the relative dominance of
the historical and functional conceptions of section 1983 and the relationship between them.
Tenne arose out of a dispute between Brandhove and the California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, which
was chaired by Senator Tenney. Brandhove was conducting a campaign against Tenney's Committee, charging it with using smear tactics.
When Tenney's committee summoned Brandhove to appear before it at
a hearing, Brandhove appeared but refused to testify. A state court
prosecution of Brandhove for contempt failed. Brandhove later brought
a federal civil rights damages action against the Committee and its
members, alleging that the hearing was not held for a legislative purpose
but was initiated to intimidate Brandhove and deprive him of numerous
48
constitutional rights.
The Court held that section 1983 does not abrogate the traditional
immunity of state legislators from suit. After reviewing parliamentary,
federal, and state versions of legislative immunity, Justice Frankfurter's
opinion for the Court asked whether "Congress by the general language
of its 1871 statute" meant to overturn the longstanding tradition of legislative immunity.4 9 He noted that the immunity was for the public
46
47
48
rights,
49

365 U.S. 167 (1961).
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Id. at 370-71 (alleging, inter alia, deprivation of equal protection and first amendment
due process violations, and loss of equal privileges and immunities as a U.S. citizen).
Id. at 376.
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good and that it encouraged courageous behavior by legislators, and he
concluded that Congress would not "impinge on a tradition so well
grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language" of section 1983.50 In apparent reliance on principles of federalism, Justice Frankfurter also expressed doubt about both the power of
Congress to impose civil liability upon state legislators and the wisdom
of doing so.51

Tenney's doctrinal analysis is an important source of difficulty in
section 1983 litigation. It neglects both the language and the political
and historical context of section 1983. The opinion also eschews realistic
discussion of the likely response to denying state legislators absolute immunity-indemnification of legislators by the state. Tenny thus isolates
section 1983 from an important technique for accommodating both the
need for compensation of victims and the desire to insulate the immediate wrongdoer from full responsibility. In a broader perspective, Tenng
reveals the Court's early leaning towards a functional view of section
1983. The case offered an opportunity to merge the functional and historical views of section 1983 in a way that would preserve the essence of
both. Instead, Tenney made the two views competitors: A functional,
broad view of section 1983 was made to correspond with a reduction in
its ability to serve its core historical functions.
1. Analylical Problems in Tenney
Tenney implicitly rejects interpreting section 1983 through the simple expedient of reading it. Whatever else legislators are, they also are
"persons," the word section 1983 employs to describe those whose misbehavior it encompasses. Of course, in interpreting section 1983, as in construing any other provision, plain text may provide incomplete
guidance. 52 Because the statute affords no exceptions for special classes
of persons and because the state legislators who enacted the Black Codes
were among the persons whose misbehavior chiefly distressed the Reconstruction Congresses, 53 the Court should have dealt explicitly with section 1983's text. Given the statute's text and the result Justice
Frankfurter seemed determined to reach, it is not surprising that he
rested his case on other grounds.
Understandably, Justice Frankfurter tried to tie the Court's decision to Congress's will. He argued that Congress, sensitive to the need
for legislative freedom, would not have impinged on the historical tradiId. at 376-77.
Id. at 376.
See, e.g., Bator, The State Courts andFederal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 622 n.49 (1981). See generaly note 99 infra.
53 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74, 180 (1961) (a purpose of§ 1983 is to override certain state laws).
50
51
52
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tion of immunity without some express signal. 54 There being none, he
continued, the Court "cannot believe that Congress. . .would impinge
on a tradition so well grounded in history. ...
This line of analysis is something of a legal shell game. In Tenny,
the statutory language is plain-the statute literally covers legislatorsbut the absence of express legislative history is said to mandate a narrow
interpretation of the plain language. One could apply this analysis to
the entire statute and find no congressional intent to break with the
tradition of state autonomy that predated the Civil War and was traceable back to the revolution. Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter must have
recognized, the Court could have reversed the burden of persuasion on
the immunity issue to generate a different conclusion. Given the plain
language and no express contrary guidance in the legislative history,
why not conclude, as the Court would in other contexts, 56 that Congress
57
meant what it said: State legislators are subject to liability.
More importantly, the traditional legislative privileges that form
the basis of Justice Frankfurter's argument provide less guidance than
he suggested. Tenng's straightforward appeal to historical legislative
privileges, and the statement that Congress could not have meant to
change so basic a rule, obscure a crucial issue. All agree that the Civil
War amendments and related legislation revolutionized federal-state relations. 58 State legislative misbehavior in violation of the Constitution
and section 1983 was well within the sphere of activity that became
amenable to federal sanctions. Given the revolution in federalism that
accompanied the enactment of section 1983, and the category of behavior under consideration, Justice Frankfurter derived definitive guidance
from what was in fact a different legal era. The gap between pre- and
54 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
55 Id.
56 See text accompanying note 142 infra.
57 The Court has used the technique employed in Tennf , (requiring a clear statement to
modify a position obviously favored by the Court) to confer other immunities under § 1983,
see text accompanying note 79 infra, and in numerous other areas affecting civil rights litigation, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring Congress to state its intention to enforce fourteenth amendment guarantees); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980) (requiring express disaffirmation of res judicata rules); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-43 (1979) (requiring clear congressional statement to induce Court
not to find Bivens action under fifth amendment); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-44
(1979) (requiring express statement to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity). See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-36, 3-37, 5-8, at 243, 5-17, at 288-89, 5-19, at
299, 5-20, at 304-05, 6-24, at 381 (1978). An important early use of the clear statement rule
was the Court's suggestion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873), that
a clearer statement than the fourteenth amendment would be required for the Court to assume that the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause was intended substantially to restrict state prerogatives.
58 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
453-56 (1976) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, J.); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238
(1973).
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post-Civil War notions of federalism requires more of a bridge than Justice Frankfurter's sterile recitation of state legislators' privileges prior to
section 1983's enactment.
Additional factors cloud the logical relevance of Justice Frankfurter's legislative immunity precedents. Even if there had been no
nineteenth-century revolution in federalism, the legislative immunities
that Justice Frankfurter invoked involve governmental relationships
fundamentally different from those at issue in Tenngy. No English or
American immunity provides precise guidance for a case brought
against state legislators under section 1983 for violating federal constitutional rights. The English parliamentary privilege, the various state
privileges, and the speech or debate clause are safeguards to secure the
separation of powers within unitary governmental systems.5 9 The king
was the main threat to parliament; 60 the executive the main threat to
Congress. 6 1 When state legislators impinge on federally protected
rights, different interests are at stake; total reliance on privileges developed for unitary governmental systems seems misplaced. It may be a
good idea to protect state legislators from private damages suits for constitutional violations, but the historical precedents are less directly on
point than Justice Frankfurter suggested. The precedents stem from dif62
ferent threats to legislative independence in different political systems.
Justice Frankfurter's failure to acknowledge the different contours
of immunity in a federal system relates to another important issue neglected in Tenney. The historical immunities relied upon did not develop
in contexts involving clear assertions of unconstitutional action-they
usually arose in cases involving state tort or contract law. Until the
twentieth century, individuals enjoyed relatively few affirmative constitutional protections against state officials' behavior. Thus, nineteenthcentury immunity cases do not rely on absolute immunity as a defense
to the clear offensive assertion of a constitutional claim. 63 The essen59 See Reinstein & Silverglate, Legirlative Prvilegeandthe Separationof Powers, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1113, 1122-48 (1973).
60 Id. at 1129.
61 Id. at 1139.
62
On a selective basis the Court acknowledges and even relies upon the federal government's place at the top of the structure of American government to reject immunity claims by
state officials and local governments. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647
(1980) (relying on the will of the "supreme" (federal) sovereign to abrogate any vestige of
state sovereign immunity that municipalities may have enjoyed); United States v. Gillock,
445 U.S. 360, 368-73 (1980) (federal criminal liability of state legislators). The Court's treatment of the liability of state and federal chief executives also reflects this hierarchy. Compare
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (granting president absolute immunity from private damages actions) with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (upholding cause of action for money damages against state governor). This factor disappears when the Court issues
a Tennf,-like opinion that upholds state or local immunity. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332 (1979).
63 See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Bradley
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tially federal nature of many actions against state officials, and the realistic possibility of recovery, did not clearly emerge until the twentieth
64
century.
To support the grant of immunity in Tenngy, Justice Frankfurter
might have made a case for borrowing directly from nonconstitutional
tort law. Tort law is a traditional mechanism with which to regulate
government behavior. Constitutional violations do not result from behavior different in kind from behavior that involves other legal violations. Nor does constitutional misbehavior contain any generic
characteristics that facilitate singling it out for treatment through a separate system of liability. Constitutional limitations are united more by
history and a label than by such shared characteristics. They comprise a
category of misbehavior that happens to run afoul of one of the limitations on official behavior found necessary or convenient to include in the
Constitution. Nothing inherent in constitutional misbehavior renders
traditional tort policy inapplicable.
Whatever policies support immunity in nonconstitutional contexts,
however, there are factors worth considering before extending immunity
to cases involving constitutional rights. For example, deprivations of
constitutional rights simply might be deemed too important to go unremedied, regardless of the possible effects on public officials. The law
frequently distinguishes between constitutional rights and other rights.
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868);
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804). None of these cases, which are the major federal nineteenth-century precedents granting or denying immunity, involves a plaintiff's offensive use of the Constitution to state a
cause of action. The Court, however, has relied on them to support or shape its modern
immunity decisions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In an important exception to this trend, litigants
did make offensive use of the Constitution in takings cases. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at
491 n.16; note 64 infra. On occasion, the Court seems not to distinguish between offensive and
defensive use of constitutional provisions (other than the takings clause). Thus, the Butz opinion invokes Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C. Ind. 1871) (No. 9,605) in the discussion of
immunity of federal officials from constitutionally-based claims. See 438 U.S. at 491 n.15.
Yet AMilligan used the Constitution only to evaluate the merits of a defense to a nonconstitutional cause of action.
64
E parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 152-56 (1908), established the principle in the case of
equitable relief against state officers. See Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 489, 521-25 (1954). With some antecedents, particularly in voting rights and
takings cases, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), established the principle in the case of
damages actions against state officials. For a helpful discussion of those antecedents, see Hill,
ConstitutionalRemedies,69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1124-28, 1138-41, 1158-61 (1969). The modem trend toward federalizing causes of action against state officials does not necessarily imply
that courts have rejected or should reject nineteenth century common law immunities in
actions against state officials. But the federalization of the cause of action does suggest, and
even requires, a rethinking of those immunities in light of the now clearly recognized federal
constitutional interests at stake. The Court in Tennof pretended that no such rethinking was
necessary, an approach that, with some exceptions, carried over to judicial and other immunities. For the exceptions, see the cases cited at note 67 in/a.
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Nonconstitutional rights may be modified legislatively without the cumbersome constitutional amendment process. In habeas corpus cases,
constitutional claims, unlike other claims, form a basis for upsetting important traditional rules favoring finality in criminal proceedings.6 5
And since Ex parle Young, 66 unconstitutional behavior has stripped state
officials of shelter otherwise provided by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Despite these differences, Justice Frankfurter wrote as if questions
of official immunity are exactly the same for constitutional as for nonconstitutional violations. It is within the range of possibility to have
immunity rules for constitutional claims that are less preclusive of recoveries than those for nonconstitutional claims. Indeed, this is just the situation in the case of executive officials and municipalities. 67 The
justification need run no deeper than it runs in other areas in which
constitutional claims receive favored treatment. Either constitutional
claims are more important than other claims, or the system must pretend that this is so. It is the Constitution that every legislator, judge,
and executive official takes an oath to support; 68 to violate constitutional norms is to break the American social contract. However one
may resolve this issue, Tenngy's constitutional overtones differentiate the
case from most of the history and precedent relied on by Justice
Frankfurter.
Justice Frankfurter's effort to link state officials' immunity to sound
public policy also seems strained. He wrote:
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the
public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected
to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
69
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.
Unlike other factors relied on in Tenney, this argument seems applicable
to both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims. But Justice Frankfurter again overlooks important considerations that might support a
contrary result. In the case of civil actions by private citizens, legislators, more than other public officials, are able to protect themselves.
They may enact statutes authorizing state payment of the cost of their
legal defense and reimbursement for the costs of any judgments ren65
66

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(c) (1976).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
67 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (common law municipal immunities inapplicable in constitutional cases). Compare Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) with Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
68
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
69 341 U.S. at 377.
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dered against them. If corporate directors may be protected from the
many forms of lawsuit they face, it seems likely that state legislators,
with the power to enact laws and raise funds, would find ways to cush70
ion any liability imposed upon them.
This raises the question whether such a system of liability and indemnification is superior to the Tenne doctrine of absolute legislative
immunity. At first blush, it saves the best features of absolute immunity
and overcomes its principal weakness. Under a reimbursement system,
legislators need fear neither liability nor the costs of defending lawsuits,
and victims receive compensation. As long as the immunity of states
from liability survives, 7' the liability of state legislators is one vehicle
with which to shift and spread the financial burden of an unconstitutional law. The cost is spread among the citizenry that elected the
72
wrongdoing officials.
70 See also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 713 n.9 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring) (mentioning reimbursement to defendants in § 1983 actions). There may be
intangible political limits to legislators' ability to protect themselves from the burdens of civil
litigation. Some legislators may take actions that are so unpopular that a reimbursement
scheme would prove politically impossible to enact. This limitation may, however, be more
theoretical than actual. Reimbursement provisions need not be enacted on a case-by-case
basis; a provision that applies to all situations is unlikely to be sufficiently controversial to
become a political liability for those voting in favor of it. Even if case-by-case protection were
the norm, one could at least be sure that, despite popular opposition, legislators would be
sensitive to the need to protect their colleagues from civil actions.
A recent episode illustrates one legislature's willingness to insulate a member from liability despite disagreement with the substance of the member's views. California State Senator
John G. Schmitz issued a press release that called abortion-rights advocates "bulldykes,"
"queers," "murderous marauders" and people with "hard, Jewish and (arguably) female
faces," and that called Gloria Allred a "slick butch lawyeress." Nat'l L.J., Mar. 15, 1982, at 7.
Ms. Allred commenced a libel action and the Senate Rules Committee agreed to pay an
attorney $125 an hour to defend Senator Schmitz. The Rules Committee justified its action
on the ground that the state might be liable for Senator Schmitz's behavior. Ms. Allred, not
wishing to impose any liability on the state, expressed her willingness to waive any claim
against the state. Id.
If one only takes account of the likelihood of reimbursement, the existing individual
immunity hierarchy seems upside down: The low-ranking executive official is least able to
assure his own reimbursement, but remains liable; legislators, on the other hand, are most
able to secure reimbursement but are absolutely immune.
71 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Holladay v. Montana, 506 F. Supp. 1317
(D. Mont. 1981). But cf.Irwin v. Calhoun, 522 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1981) (certifying question of immunity in federal court to state supreme court); Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F.
Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980) (state waived immunity). See generally note 72 infta. The issue in
Irwin and Marrapese, whether a state has waived its eleventh amendment immunity in federal
court, should be distinguished from the question whether a waiver of immunity in a state's
.own courts is binding in federal court. The Supreme Court has answered the latter question
in the negative. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 651, 677 n.19 (1974); Chandler v. Dix, 194
U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904).
72
If one accepts reimbursement as a likely outgrowth of eliminating absolute legislative
(or other) immunity, the immunity issue becomes closely akin to the question whether the
state itself should be liable for damages caused by enactment of unconstitutional legislation.
If every successful suit against a legislator generates a state-funded reimbursement to the
legislator, such suits begin to resemble suits against the state. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
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One serious objection voiced against reimbursement systems (al-

though not necessarily against systems for reimbursing legislators) is that
they may exclude certain classes of behavior, such as malicious conduct. 73 This may be a powerful objection to the relaxation of some immunities, but it carries its least force in the context of legislative
immunity. If legislators sense a danger to their pocketbooks or independence, it seems likely that they will find a way to protect themselves.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether gaps in -current official indemnifiction systems militate against expanding individual liability under section 1983. These gaps may only demonstrate that successful suits
against officials are not a substantial problem. The gaps' existence does
not reveal whether they would continue under a regime of more widespread official liability. Therefore, the incompleteness of existing indemnity systems does not justify limiting individual liability under
section 1983. If recovery for violations of constitutional rights were the
rule rather than the exception, state legislators might feel the need to
establish more complete systems of indemnity.
Thus, as a matter of doctrinal analysis, Tenney is less than satisfactory. One also may ask whether Tenney offers a coherent general conception of section 1983. From the perspective of the "historical" vision of
section 1983, Tenngy abounds in irony. The opinion drapes itself in his-

U.S. 651, 665 (1974); Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 380 F.
Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (three-judge court), aJ'd,519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975).
Such suits, at least in federal courts, encounter the eleventh amendment immunity of states
from suit. Is a reimbursement system sufficiently like recovery from the state to bring into
play the eleventh amendment immunity? The obvious answer is no. Any reimbursement
system operates at the initiative of and subject to the will of the state. Reimbursement systems do not impinge upon the state's sovereignty to the extent that traditional damages actions against states do. See L. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 3-35, at 132-33 n.22. One must pause
before relying on this answer, however, because the Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence is so bizarre that few confident predictions may be made. Cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 10-15 (1890) (eleventh amendment interpreted in a way that bears no relation to its
language); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (distinguishing between counties
and states for eleventh amendment purposes). Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
663-64 (1974) (eleventh amendment prevents suits for retroactive damages) with Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (eleventh amendment permits suits requiring states to
pay cost of future compliance with Constitution).
One commentator has argued that the Court's eleventh amendment doctrine does not
prohibit federal damages actions against states in their own courts. See Wolcher, Sovereign
Immunity and the Suprmac Clause.. DamagesAgainst States in Their Own Courtrfor Constitutional
Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1981). But see State v. Green, 633 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1981)
(states are not "persons" and therefore are not amenable to suit in state court under § 1983).
73 See Bermann,supra note 4, at 1190-91 nn.95-98; Cass, supra note 2, at 1172-73; Schuck,
supra note 2, at 330-38; Discussion, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 80, 110 (Winter 1978) (comments of Prof. Dellinger). But see Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781,
811 (1979) (police officers indemnified even though payors retain the right not to reimburse
for egregious misconduct). It also has been argued that psychological costs attend naming
individuals as defendants in lawsuits. See Discussion, supra, at 107-08 (comments of Prof.
Davis). But see id. (comments of Prof. Shavell).

1982]

SECTION 1.983

tory, but uses the history of immunity out of context, and fails to shape
section 1983 according to a conception based on its history.
Tenney implicitly accepts a broad, functional scope for section 1983.
The constitutional rights at issue in Tenney (basically a first amendment
claim combined with claims of crass political motive) bore little resemblence to the rights of racial equality that were the core concern of the
1871 Act. Yet the Court nowhere questioned the use of section 1983 to
vindicate first amendment rights. In addition, Tenney's absolute barrier
to recovery violated the second principle derivable from the historical
conception of section 1983: By its-terms, Tenne,'s ban applies even in
race cases of the kind that formed the historical backdrop for section
1983. Even if one believes that legislative immunity should survive in
those core cases, such a holding requires a good deal more explanation
than was offered in the Tenngy opinion.
Whether Tenng fits nicely into a historical or functional approach
to section 1983 is less important than another of its implications. Tenngy
suggests that a broad, functional reading of the rights to which section
1983 applies can be accomplished only at a cost. That cost is a loss of
the depth to which section 1983 will penetrate to redress constitutional
deprivations-even in cases raising the core historical concerns of racial
equality. Tenne might have carved out this class of cases for separate
treatment. After Tenne, even in cases of clear racial discrimination, legislators are absolutely immune. Thus, because the Court in Tenne did
not reserve room to restrict immunities in race cases, section 1983's historical mission in race cases competes with its modern functional role as
the catch-all constitutional remedy.
2. Tenney's Legay
Even acknowledging the weaknesses in Justice Frankfurter's analysis, other issues must be addressed before embracing greater legislative
liability in all cases involving constitutional deprivations. Legislators
are, after all, legislators. In theory, they come as close to being sovereign
as this country will allow. And difficult problems of causation and attribution must be solved to attach liability to individual members of a
voting group. But even if legislators are entitled to greater deference
than other officials, 74 much of what one might say about legislative immunity need not carry over with full force to other classes of officials.
Yet Tenney 's maladies infected much of subsequent immunity doctrine;
its neglect of context, its insensitivity to the dual system of government
in which section 1983 operates, and its generally narrow approach to
immunity issues set the tone for future cases. In addition, establishing
74
Cf C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
93 (1960) (suggesting constitutional limits on congressional power to deal with state
legislators).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:482

state legislative immunity has had important effects independent of the
Court's reasoning.
The first development extended Tenne,'s grant of immunity to
judges. Prior to Tenny, some courts had concluded that section 1983
meant what it said and that any person, including a judge, might be
liable. 75 Courts concerned about Congress's intent could point to
passages in the legislative history that suggested some awareness that the
statute might be used against state judges. 76 And unlike legislators,
judges did not have so uniform a tradition of immunity upon which to
rely.

77

Tenne itself, however, supplied all the interpretive weapons necessary to extend its holding. First, Tenney showed that section 1983's text
can be made irrelevant to an immunity inquiry. Lower courts that relied on the plain language had been naive or incomplete in their analyses. 78 Second, although the history of judicial immunity differed from
that of legislative immunity, the Tenney approach proved flexible. Even
if judges were not as frequently immune as legislators, they often had
been immune. Without any express reference to judges in section 1983
or an express mandate in the legislative history, courts found it easy to
extend immunity to judges. 79 As in Tenn, courts ignored the fact that
state judicial immunity from federal civil rights actions posed problems
different from those raised by judicial immunity within a unitary governmental system. Also following Tenney, courts did not consider
whether the traditional immunity of judges, developed in nonconstitutional contexts,80 should recede in the face of constitutional claims, or
whether some form of reimbursement scheme would better accommodate the competing interests. Tenney even provided a new argument to
75 Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946); Picking v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); see McShane v.
Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949) (by implication).
76 See Note, Liability ofJudiial OJters Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 324-28
(1969).
77

Id. at 325-27.

78 See Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Tate
v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1955) ("[G]eneral language. . . in the Civil Rights Act
does not evidence a clear Congressional intent to impair. . . judicial immunity.").
79 See, e.g., cases cited in note 78 supra.
80 The Supreme Court endorsed judicial immunity in two modem cases, Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), but it did not offer any
historical precedent in which judicial immunity was invoked to defeat a constitutionalclaim.
To support judicial immunity, Pierson relied on Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1872), a case in which John Suratt's attorney challenged his expulsion from the bar. 386
U.S. at 554. Although the claim might have been phrased in constitutional terms (and today
undoubtedly would be so framed) neither the attorney's argument nor the Court's opinion
treats the case as having constitutional overtones. Stump relied on Bradlq and also referred to
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1869). See 435 U.S. at 355 n.5. Randall, which
also involved removal of an attorney from the bar, did not discuss federal constitutional
issues.
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which judges deciding section 1983 cases might be expected to be particularly sensitive: If state legislators are immune, it would be unseemly to
grant state judges less protection. 8 '
The Supreme Court, again invoking Tenny, finally formally
adopted absolute judicial immunity from section 1983 actions in Pierson
v. Ray.82 In addressing the issue of defenses available to executive officials, Pierson owed an additional debt to Tenny. Pierson held that arresting police officers enjoy no absolute immunity from suit under section
1983. The officers might, however, defend such actions on the ground
that they reasonably believed their behavior to be constitutional. s 3 In
Pierson, as in Tenne, the Court adopted for section 1983 a body of doctrine developed in a context other than one involving state officers violating federal constitutional rights; it adopted the defense to the
common law action for false arrest. But false arrest cases had occurred
within unitary legal systems and, in most instances, had not involved
8 4
constitutional violations.
Tenne's holding, as distinct from its method of analysis, also had an
important effect in Pierson. However much the policies relied on in Tenne might support absolute immunity for police and other executive officials, the police officers in Pierson had little practical chance of obtaining
it. Tenne already had immunized legislators. Monroe v. Pape had immunized cities, 85 and few people thought seriously about reaching the state
under section 1983.86 With Pierson'sgrant of immunity to judges, either
executive officials would remain subject to liability or section 1983

82
83

See Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809, 811-12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 835 (1953).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Id. at 555.

84

Commentators have long suggested or implied that constitutional doctrine played

81

virtually no role in shaping the common law liability of state and local officials for what today
would be characterized as civil rights violations. See, e.g., 2 C. ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF
ARREST IN CRIMINAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS §§ 514, 548-550 (1949) (no mention of constitutional overtones to actions against officials); I W. ANDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS AND CONSTABLES § 132 (1941) (other than habeas corpus actions
and a civil action for false imprisonment, no effective remedy for illegal arrest exists); 1 F.
MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 770 (1890) (officer
liable for illegal arrest but no mention of constitutional overtones to such action); W. MURFREE,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFFS AND OTHER MINISTERIAL OFFICERS §§

931,

1161 (1884) (sheriff at risk for some unlawful arrests but no mention of constitutional sources
for such actions).
By partially insulating police officers from § 1983 liability, Pierson also became the first
case to build upon a related theme of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe called for
§ 1983 to "be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions." Id. at 187. In Monroe, this passage served to justify
rejecting a stringent state of mind requirement as a prerequisite to § 1983 liability. Pierson
borrowed this theme: "Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers
making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause." 386 U.S. at 556-57.
85 365 U.S. at 191-92.
86 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which eliminated
Monroe's bar on suits against cities, triggered a debate over state liability under § 1983. See
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would become a farce, providing an all-encompassing cause of action
against numerous absolutely immune defendants.8 7 Thus, the police defendants in Pierson would not enjoy absolute immunity, if for no other
reason than because their case arose after the parade of cases in which
everyone else had been granted immunity.
Tenney's establishment of legislative immunity has recently become
important in another way. In 1979, the Supreme Court in Lake Countr
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgeny 88 suggested that vast new
categories of official misbehavior might be shielded from liability under
the umbrella of legislative immunity. The Court in Lake County Estates
held that appointed members of a bi-state agency enjoyed absolute legislative immunity when acting in a "legislative capacity" because the
functions that they performed were sufficiently similar to those performed by legislators. The Court did not reveal what the Tahoe defendants did that made their acts legislative. The Agency's functions were
"to adopt and to enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation,
conservation, recreation, and public services." 89 The members of the
Agency, however, did not propose, consider and enact general laws. The
functions that they performed seemed analogous to those of planning
authorities, zoning boards, and administrative agencies at every level of
government.
By not articulating the criteria that made the Tahoe planners "legislators," the Court has encouraged many section 1983 defendants to
assert that their challenged acts also fit the Lake Countrg Estates standard
for legislative behavior. For example, an internal policymaking board
may promulgate rules for hiring in a large city police department.
Within their general sphere of coverage, the rules resemble traditional
legislation. Should all who promulgate such classes of regulations be
absolutely immune? If so, defendants in section 1983 actions then will
attempt to tie each challenged decision to their own self-generated set of
quasi-legislative standards. 9° If pre-Lake County Estates empirical results
are any guide, defendants may not even have to plead quasi-legislative
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700-01, 704 (1978) (separate opinions of Justices Brennan and
Powell). The debate ended with Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
87 The Court employed similar reasoning to reject absolute immunity for federal executive officials. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978).
88 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
89 Id. at 394.
90 See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (city directors
absolutely immune from liability for enacting allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinance).
After Lake Countr Estates and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (granting absolute
judicial and prosecutorial immunity to certain administrative officials), one could glean from
portions of the Court's opinion in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), powerful arguments for reversing the Court's decision there to deny school board members absolute immunity. See, e.g., id. at 319 ("As the facts of this case reveal, school board members function at
different times in the nature of legislators and adjudicators in the school disciplinary process.")
(emphasis added).
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immunity. A court eager to avoid yet another section 1983 case will
pronounce the defendant immune on the slightest chance that Lake
County Estates is applicable.9 1
It should be added, however, that neither Lake Countg Estates nor a
subsequent Supreme Court legislative immunity decision, Supreme Court
of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 92 mandates broad new
categories of legislative immunity. On their facts, both cases are distinguishable from the onslaught of new legislative immunity claims that
courts can expect to encounter. Lake Tahoe, the area regulated by the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, has strong connections to two states,
neither of which satisfactorily could regulate growth in the area on its
own. Thus, one could view the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency as a
"regional" legislature exercising at least some functions traditionally
carried on by state and local legislative bodies. Those performing the
tasks that legislators from the two states could not perform were entitled
to traditional legislative immunity. The need for this novel layer of governmental action could be viewed as the basis for deeming the Agency's
acts to be legislative. Under this view, Lake Countg Estates provides little
basis for extending legislative immunity to other officials.
In Supreme Court of Virginia, the Court held that the judges of the
state's highest court enjoyed legislative immunity from suits alleging the
illegality of Virginia's Code of Professional Responsibility. 93 But the
Supreme Court of Virginia opinion was a far cry from an authorization of
legislative immunity for every state official who promulgates rules of
general applicability. The opinion emphasizes the Virginia court's claim
of inherent power to regulate the bar and that court's exercise of the
94
state's "entire legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar."
The members of the Virginia court, the Supreme Court noted, "are the
State's legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code." 95 Thus,
91 Tenne's establishment of legislative immunity also virtually assures that there will be
no satisfactory remedy in an important class of constitutional cases. Consider, for example,
the case of an unconstitutional statute enforced by a state executive official. Legislators who
support unconstitutional measures, particularly when they believe them to be unconstitutional, are more culpable than the officials who enforce them. Yet only executive officials are
liable to those adversely affected by unconstitutional statutes and executive officials may have
a good faith defense. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). This defense, when combined with legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial immunity, often leaves those harmed by
unconstitutional laws without a damages remedy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and
its progeny often make it difficult to obtain prospective relief against the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes. In this area, then, the post-Tennov liability-immunity system is a
clumsy accommodation to the absolute protection that Tenn , grants to the potentially greatest wrongdoers. See text accompanying notes 281-91 infra.
92 446 U.S. 719 (1980). Supreme Court of Virginia involved an attack on Virginia's Code of
Professional Responsibility, which the state supreme court promulgated.
93 Id. at 731-34.
94 Id. at 734.
95

Id.
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other administrators who might seek the protection of legislative immunity lack the inherent claim to broad legislative power asserted by the
Virginia court.
With some effort, then, one can analogize the challenged behavior

in Lake Count Estates and Supreme Court of Virginia to more traditional
legislative activity. And at least the Supreme Court has not yet adopted
the broadest implications of Lake Counti Estates. The Court's emphasis
in Supreme Court of Virginia on factors that do not apply to the vast majority of administrative officials, and its surprising absence of reliance on
Lake County Estates, may represent implicit rejection of a broad reading
96

of Lake Country Estates.

Analysis of Tenney and its legacy reveals more than doctrinal tension. It also illustrates the competition, initiated in Tenney, between the
historical and functional visions of section 1983. In the political context
of 1871, it is questionable whether Congress would have endorsed any
immunities in section 1983 cases. Approval by that Congress of their
extension to a novel area, as in Lake Counity Estates, is inconceivable. By
the time Lake Country Estates was decided, however, section 1983 was
firmly established as reaching all constitutional deprivations. 9 7 The toll
that Tenney had exacted for this departure from the historical conception
of section 1983 had grown enormously. What started in Tenney as a
grant of immunity in a relatively strong case for immunity has now
grown to include grants of immunity in far less compelling situations.
D.

Monroe v. Pape

1. The Scope of Section 1983
By the time Monroe v. Pape was decided in 1961, Tenney unobtrusively had established a mold that would shape much of section 1983.
But Monroe added refinements of its own, not the least of which was its
express opening of section 1983 to all constitutional claims. In discussing whether section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of
fourteenth amendment rights, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
stated:
Its purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, "An Act to enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13. Allegation of
facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of [§ 1983]. So far petitioners are -on solid
ground. For the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the Fourth Amendment has been made applicable to the
96 But cf. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-94 (5th Cir.1981) (mayor
absolutely immune for legislative acts), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
97
See text accompanying note 103 in/a.
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States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 98
This literalism, in contrast with Tenne's failure to adhere to section
1983's language, 99 clearly endorsed the functional approach to section
1983. The breadth of section 1983's language seems to betray its limited
historical origins. But Justice Douglas's literalism oversimplified a difficult issue-there was more to the matter than simply reading the
statute.

The SlaughterhouseCases 00 in 1873 mark the beginning of an important line of precedent supporting a narrower view of section 1983. The
Slaughterhouse Court interpreted the privileges or immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment to protect only the narrow class of rights it
deemed to be inherent in federal citizenship. This narrow interpretation
98 Id. at 171 (citation omitted).
99 Neither Tenne,'s downplay of the text of § 1983 nor Monroe's blind reliance on it are
isolated occurrences. In each case in which the Court confers an absolute or qualified immunity, the Court, as in Tenn,, must abandon literal application of the statute. See, e.g., Quern
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). But there is a
forceful countertrend in which the Court relies on § 1983's language. Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 534 (1981), relied in part on § 1983's text to reject limiting the coverage of§ 1983 to
intentional deprivations of constitutional rights. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 635, 650 (1980), and Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978),
relied on the express design and language of § 1983 to impose liability on municipalities.
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), relied on § 1983's "plain language" to interpret it
to cover federal statutory claims, a reliance soon abandoned in Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), relied
on § 1983's "categorical remedial language" to shape the good faith defense of school board
members.
The Court's treatment of the language of § 1983 reached a low point in Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976), where the Court relied in part on the language to resolve an issue
that the statute does not address. After noting that § 1983 imposes liability "only for conduct
which 'subjects, or causes to be subjected' a complainant to a deprivation of a [constitutional]
right," the Court rejected as not fitting the statutory language relief against a police department and police supervisors for unconstitutional behavior by individual officers. See also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (language asserted to support
rejection of respondeatsupierior liability for cities). Yet tort law often deems a causal connection
to exist between behavior by subordinates and their superiors or employing entities. A causal
connection is there if one wishes to find it (see Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir.
1978) (failure to act can "cause" harm within the meaning of § 1983)) and, therefore, the
statutory language is not necessarily determinative. Accord, Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation
After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 218, 234 (1979). Many lower courts have limited Rizzo's
barrier to supervisory liability. See Avery v. Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981); Withers
denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Dimarzo v. Cahill,
v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162-63 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978); Watson v. McGee, 527 F. Supp.
575 F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir.), cert.
234 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Wilcher v. Curley, 519 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D. Md. 1980); Salinas v. Breier,
517 F. Supp. 1272, 1276-77 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (citing cases). NeitherRizzo nor Monell discusses
the line of cases finding supervisors liable under § 1983 when they would be liable under state
law. See Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901
(9th Cir. 1971). But see Smith v. Jordan, 527 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Seiber v.
Cooper, 522 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.Tenn. 1981).
100 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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prevented the privileges or immunities clause from supplying any protection against the outrages that had precipitated the Civil War amendments and related legislation. Yet because of linguistic similarities
between the clause interpreted in Slaughterhouse and the text of section
1983,101 some courts held that section 1983 protected only those rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities

clause. 102
Justice Douglas correctly suggested that section 1983's text supports
a broader view of the provision than that embraced by earlier opinions.
Section 1983 seems to cover all constitutional rights.' 0 3 And extending
the attitude of the Slaughterhouse Cases to section 1983 would preclude
section 1983 from providing protection even in the core areas of concern
to the 1871 Congress. But the Court never has disavowed the Slaughterhouse Cases. And even if that decision were wrong or irrelevant to interpreting the scope of section 1983, the Monroe Court at least owed an
explanation of why it chose to reject the restrictive section 1983

precedents.
A more serious problem arises because, having relied on section

1983's text to support his view, and having ignored contrary precedent,
Justice Douglas undertook no analysis of the section's scope. That section 1983's text supports an interpretation broader than that suggested
by the Slaughterhouse line of cases does not necessarily mean that the section must be read, as Justice Douglas read it, to encompass every constitutional claim brought under the fourteenth amendment. In effect, he
embraced a functional approach to section 1983 without acknowledging
the existence of a competing vision.
It is possible to argue along historical lines for a'narrower view of
section 1983 that takes account of its broad language. When Congress
enacted section 1983, relatively few constitutional rights restricted state
activities. The new class of rights underlying enactment of section 1983
was a subcategory within the narrow category of constitutional rights
101 Section 1983 protects "rights,privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added). The fourteenth amendment prohibits
abridgment of 'kvileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § I (emphasis added).
102 See Brawner v. Irvin, 169 F. 964, 966 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909); Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1161 n.141 (1977). In some circles, this
restrictive view of the rights protected by civil rights statutes did not die easily. See United
States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 481-85 (M.D. Ga. 1964) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1976) not to cover acts of racially motivated misbehavior because such misbehavior does not
infringe federal citizenship rights), revod, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See a/so Holt v. Indiana Mfg.
Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900) (§ 1983 protects only "civil rights" and does not encompass constitutional attack on state tax practices).
103 Cf. Fair Assessment In Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981) (§ 1983
does not encompass damages actions to redress unconstitutional administration of state tax
system where state provides effective remedy). But see Spears v. Mount Etna Morris, 313 F.
Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1969), a,'dsub noam. Spears v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir. 1970)
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that bound the states. These new rights, embodied in the Reconstruction program, afforded Blacks increased piotection. Because of the narrow scope of other constitutional rights, Congress did not have to pay
great attention to the way in which it described the rights that would
give rise to a cause of action. In particular, Congress could, without
drastic consequence, employ the catch-all "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" to describe the rights protected. The
massive expansion of constitutional rights in the second half of the twentieth century raises the question whether the century-old statute should
create a federal cause of action for every constitutional violation.
This argument should be assessed in conjunction with the second
issue addressed by the Court in Monroe-the meaning of "under color of
law" in section 1983. May action not authorized by state law be considered action under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983?
On this issue, Justice Douglas attempted to provide greater analytical
support for his expansive view of section 1983. In a lengthy review of the
purposes of the section, he claimed to find support for the view that
"under color of law" includes action not authorized by state law.104 As
10 5
has been noted, however, none of his evidence provides such support.
104 364 U.S. 167, 172-87 (1961). This expansive view of the color of law requirement
suffered a slight contraction when the Court held that state-funded public defenders do not
act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
105 See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1486, 1489-92 (1969). As a matter of opinion-writing, it is not clear that all that
much support was necessary. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945), and to a lesser
extent, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 323 & n.6 (1941), already had interpreted a
"color of law" requirement in an analogous civil rights statute not to require behavior authorized by state law. These decisions made it difficult for the Monroe Court to construe § 1983's
color of law requirement differently. Justice Frankfurter, however, was not deterred and, in
Monroe, he attempted in dissent to refight the battle lost in Screws. See 365 U.S. at 202-59
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The timing of Screws and Monroe may have played a more significant role in § 1983's
growth than generally is recognized. Expansive interpretation of § 1983 depended upon expansive readings of both the rights protected by § 1983 and the "under color of law" requirement. Because Screws already had resolved one of these issues, Monroe did not have to render
expansive interpretations on both matters. More importantly, Screws interpreted generously
the color of law requirement in a context in which much less was at stake than was the case
with the interpretation in Monroe.
Two factors enabled the Screws Court to interpret expansively the color of law requirement in a criminal civil rights statute without fear of major repercussions. First, in criminal
cases the power of initiation rests solely with the prosecutor, not with the aggrieved parties.
In criminal civil rights cases, this power of initiation is used sparingly. See R. CARR, FEDERAL
PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 125-33 & n.17 (1947). Second, at the
time of Screws, the Court had not yet begun its rapid expansion of constitutional rights.
By 1961, however, the constitutional explosion was under way. In the civil context of a
§ 1983 case, expansive views of the under color of law requirement are not tempered by the
power of initiation present in criminal cases. Thus, before Monroe was decided, one of the
crucial bases for § 1983's expansion had been established. Had the color of law issue initially
arisen simultaneously with or after the growth of constitutional cases, the Court might not
have interpreted § 1983 so broadly. But cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (generous
view of § 1983's scope despite growth of federal laws).
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Once one discards Justice Douglas's evidence, there is a lack of direct guidance concerning the color of law issue. The reason is not difficult to discern. The proponents of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,106 from which section 1983 derives, probably were not primarily
concerned with what state officers did in violation of state law. Instead,
it was official misbehavior expressly or impliedly blessed by state law
that was most troubling. In an era when Black Codes and related legislation threatened to maintain a system approximating slavery, it would
have been something of a luxury to worry about constitutional deprivations that state officials thought of on their own. In addition, those state
officials who did commit egregious violations of state law could be criminally punished under section 2 of the 1871 Act, 10 7 which reached both
public and private conspiracies to violate constitutional rights. Section
1983 need not reach their misbehavior to accomplish Congress's goals.
Thus, Justice Douglas relied on section 1983's history to resolve an issue
that had not concerned Congress.
In fact, section 1983's text, which had been determinative of the
first issue in Monroe, probably undermines Justice Douglas's view. As he
interpreted the color of law qualification, it is a curious limitation in
that it is nearly redundant with the state action requirement. In recent
years, the color of law qualification has become largely irrelevant because constitutional violations usually require state action which, in
Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
107 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (§§ 2-4 of 1871
Act dealt with Klan violence). Section 2 stated in part:
[I]f two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States
. . . shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or
upon the premises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of
depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from giving
or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or
shall conspire together for the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in any State or Territory,
with intent to deny to any citizen of the United States the due and equal
protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or his property for
lawfully enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal
protection of the laws . . . each and every person so offending shall be
deemed guilty of a high crime ....
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14. Another portion of§ 2 provided for the
recovery of damages from the offending parties.
Section 2's ability to reachpn'vate misbehavior has been the subject of confusion. Compare
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (§ 2's criminal component cannot reach private
conspiracies) with Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (§ 2's civil component applied
to private conspiracy). This confusion can in part be attributed to the same tensions inherent
in § 1983. In Breckenridge, for example, the Court struggled both to make sense of the broad
language of § 2 (which seems to contemplate application to much private behavior) and to
keep § 2 within some historical limits by construing it to reach only conspiracies motivated by
race or another class-based animus. Id. at 102.
106
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turn, satisfies the color of law requirement. 10 8 In other words, the color
of law requirement adds nothing to section 1983's underlying requirement that the plaintiff be deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution.
The color of law requirement may, however, have reflected Congress's concern about action authorized by state law. If so, this would
shed further light on the first issue in Monroe-the scope of the rights
protected by section 1983. The portion of section 1983 that describes
the rights protected-the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution"-is qualified by the color of law requirement. This
qualification might have been designed to tie section 1983 to the racially
discriminatory rules that most concerned Congress. Then, as now, it
was relatively rare for state law frontally to violate constitutional
precepts. Outside the area of race relations, unconstitutional state laws
were not a serious enough problem to have prompted enactment of federal legislation. If "color of law" meant "authorized by law," section
1983 would be limited largely to racial distinctions drawn by state law
and state efforts to enforce those distinctions.'0 9 This interpretation also
gives the color of law requirement meaning independent of the state
108 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102
S. Ct. 2744, 2749 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). There are a few situations in which the differences
between action under color of law and state action are worth discussing. Private action authorized by state statutes, for example, may be action under color of law but it is not state
action. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). But this merely suggests that the
important element in § 1983 cases is the state action requirement, not the color of law requirement. Cases satisfying the state action requirement automatically satisfy the color of
law requirement. But cf.Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445, 451 n.12 (1981) (state public
defender did not act under color of law; no consideration given to whether state action was
present); Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 83 & n.17 (2d Cir. 1981) (action by state officials acting as
federal agents is not action under color of state law). The color of law requirement does have
independent significance in cases in which the allegedly violated constitutional rights are secured against private infringement. For example, the color of law requirement prevents
§ 1983 from providing a cause of action where a private person enslaves another. The thirteenth amendment, which prohibits private acts of slavery, does not require state action. E.g.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968). Therefore, a private person may
deprive another of thirteenth amendment rights; because private enslavement is not action
under color of law, however, § 1983 is inapplicable.
Although the discussion in the text suggests that the enormous overlap between state
action and color of law concepts undermines Justice Douglas's interpretation of § 1983, one
ought not to place undue emphasis on the point. Congress' enactment and the Court's invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and of other
nineteenth century civil rights laws suggest that the Reconstruction Congresses did not anticipate the broad outlines of the state action doctrine. If subsequent views of the limitations
imposed by the state action requirement differ from the views of the Reconstruction Congresses, one should not make too much of the relationship between the subsequent views of
state action and other concepts, such as color of law, in assessing the will of the Reconstruction Congresses.
109 According to this theory, "under color of law" would have the same meaning in the
1871 Act as Congress probably meant it to have in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 225-34 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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action requirement. Moreover, it explains the breadth of the "rights
protected" clause on grounds other than Congress' desire to provide a
cause of action for every constitutional violation. The clause listing the
rights protected could be phrased broadly because the color of law requirement limited section 1983 to the relatively few instances in which
positive state law posed an affirmative threat to federal law.
Thus, a more candid Monroe opinion would have acknowledged the
ambiguity inherent in the color of law concept. Justice Douglas still
might have reached the same result on the color of law issue, but with
greater fidelity to the original structure and purpose of section 1983. He
might have argued that section 1983's primary purpose was to protect
Blacks. In 1871, much progress towards that goal could be made by a
provision that only reached activities authorized by state law. In contrast, modern behavior threatening Blacks rarely comes in the form of
expressly racial state acts. At least publicly, states today disavow racial
discrimination. Therefore, to serve section 1983's overriding purpose of
protecting against harm to Blacks, ambiguities in section 1983's color of
law requirement should be resolved in favor of including behavior not
authorized by state law.' 10
This modified historical vision of section 1983 might support Justice Douglas's interpretation of the color of law requirement, but it does
not support his claim that section 1983 protects so many constitutional
rights. That conclusion ought to be reached only after a frank assessment of what really is at issue. Is it sound to provide a cause of action
for deprivation of every constitutional right? If so, is section 1983 the
appropriate vehicle? Mystical incantations about the history of section
1983 are unlikely to advance these inquiries.
The Court is still struggling to deal with the failure of Monroe to
address the question of the scope of section 1983. For example, in Maine
v. Thiboutot, the Court appeared to hold that section 1983 provides a
"
cause of action for violations of federal statutes by state officials. 11
'
This might have opened the door to private actions against state officials
under the many federal laws that impose responsibilities upon state officials. But Thiboutot's generous approach to section 1983 was one of the
Court's more short-lived experiments. In subsequent cases, the Court
has qualified the approach to exclude federal statutes in which the
Court detects a congressional desire to provide the exclusive means of

110 Cf. Crocker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 1007 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting in part) (ambiguity in § 1981 should be resolved in favor of furthering larger social
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Levinson, Book Review, 26 STAN. L. REv. 461,48283 (1974) (general purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1866 may justify modern interpretation
favorable to minorities despite more limited specific intentions of its enactors).
l'
448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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relief within the statutes.112
Although Monroe did not dictate the Thiboutot result, it established
the foundation upon which Thiboutot rests. Had Monroe limited the class
of constitutional claims that may be brought under section 1983, the
Court at least would have been forced to articulate a rationale for distinguishing between those constitutional claims it allowed and those it disallowed. That rationale would have provided guidance in ascertaining
the extent to which section 1983 should encompass violations of federal
statutes. And had the Monroe Court limited the class of constitutional
claims that could be brought under section 1983, it would have been
awkward to hold, as Thiboutot did, that the section encompassed all statutory claims. It is unlikely that Congress meant section 1983 to discriminate among federal constitutional claims but not to distinguish among
statutory claims.
There is a less obvious but more important connection between Tenne and Thiboutot. As argued earlier,113 Tenney isolated the construction
of section 1983 from the historical context in which section 1983
evolved. In doing so, Tenney protected legislators from liability and limited the effect of section 1983. Thiboutot shows that such isolated constructions can lead to expansions of section 1983 that are as questionable
as some cases contracting the scope of the provision. Regardless of one's
view of section 1983's scope in constitutional cases, it is unlikely that
Congress intended section 1983 to be used outside the fields, however
loosely defined, of constitutional and civil rights. Given the historical
context in which section 1983 arose, it is absurd to suggest that Congress
meant section 1983 to become an issue in every case asserting a violation
of federal statutory rights by state officials. Thiboutot illustrates the functional approach out of control.
Those favorably disposed towards a generous construction of section 1983 should not necessarily rejoice at the Court's holding in
Thiboutot, nor should they bemoan the inevitable subsequent limiting
decisions. When Tenney and Monroe endorsed a functional approach to
section 1983, they sacrificed its ability to provide full relief in some cases
that would be remedied under a historical approach. Thiboutot threatens
to have a similar effect on the expansive Tenneg-Monroe vision of section
1983. By viewing section 1983 as covering a broad class of statutory
claims, Thiboutot again threatens the section's utility as a remedy for constitutional violations closer to its core historical concerns.
Many of the cases that an unmodified Thiboutot view would have
allowed to be litigated under section 1983 would not provide compelling
fact situations for imposing liability on state officials. Perhaps the Jus112 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
113 See text accompanying notes 58-68 supra.
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tices were moved by the outrageous behavior in Monroe; it is unlikely
that they would be similarly moved in a case litigated under a federal
statute such as the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. 114 In
protecting state defendants in section 1983 cases brought under such
statutes, the Court would generate holdings broadly applicable to section 1983. The doctrines limiting section 1983 established in bizarre
statutory cases thus might come to limit the constitutional claims that,
under either the historical or functional views, are more central to section 1983.115
2.

The Role of Alternative Remedies

Monroe also initiated the court's treatment of the effect of alternative remedies in section 1983 cases. Once again, incomplete discussion
of the issue laid the groundwork for later conflict and confusion. Justice
Douglas deemed the availability of state remedies not to preclude an
action under section 1983: "It is no answer that the State has a law
which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked."" 6 Under this view, the Court
need not inquire into the adequacy or scope of the state remedy; that
remedy is irrelevant to the availability of a section 1983 action.
From both textual and historical perspectives, Justice Douglas's
view of the role of alternative remedies was correct. The nature of Congress' concerns in enacting section 1983 seems to preclude serious consideration of substantial deference to state proceedings. In 1871 those
proceedings were the problem, not the solution. But Tenney and Monroe
already had put a great deal of distance between this historical view of
section 1983 and the Court's interpretation of section 1983. If section
1983 is given a scope well beyond the problems of 1871, it is questionable whether each constitutional right within the statute's expanded
scope should receive the same treatment as the core rights of racial
equality.
Furthermore, although section 1983's text supported Justice Douglas's view, Tenney had shown that the text need not be determinative.
Tenney had even provided an interpretive technique that might have
114
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1340 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (cited in Appendix to Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Thibouto, 448 U.S. at 34-35).
115 Monroe's broad interpretation of § 1983 may already have taken a toll in the form of
narrow construction of the due process clause and other constitutional provisions. See Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (fourteenth amendment); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137
(1979) (fourteenth amendment); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (eighth amendment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (fourteenth amendment); Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of
Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 202 (1977).
116 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
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supported the opposite result on the issue of exhaustion of remedies. Because state tort actions had been the traditional remedy for police misconduct, a court borrowing from Tenney's treatment of the legislative
immunity issue could have required an affirmative expression of congressional will to change this pattern, at least in cases not involving the
forms of racial discrimination that were the main concern of Reconstruction era legislation. State remedies could have been deemed irrelevant only to those constitutional violations that had concerned section
1983's enactors.
A position even more deferential to state remedies might be
adopted by interpreting section 1983 in the context of the emergency
that gave rise to it. Congress, the Court has said, enacted the provision
to combat discriminatory state laws and their discriminatory enforcement or nonenforcement.'1" 7 By 1961, the problem of racial discrimination had taken on very different contours. Most states took the public
position that they stood ready to protect minority rights against Reconstruction era abuses. In light of the apparent change in attitude, the
Court might have demanded that each plaintiff prove the inadequacy of
state remedies.
In any event, a more complete Monroe opinion would have discussed why state remedies were irrelevant in section 1983 cases. There
are several reasons why Congress might want state remedies to be irrelevant, and those reasons have different implications for future cases.
Some reasons would require ignoring state remedies in all cases. If Congress was expressing its faith in the life-tenured, independent character
of the federal judiciary, all claims asserting the violation of constitutional rights could be seen as too sensitive to leave to judges without
such constitutional protection from political pressure. Alternatively,
Congress might have wanted to foster uniform decisions in the area of
constitutional remedy. Other congressional objectives might require an
inquiry into the efficacy of state remedies, with access to federal court
granted only when state remedies are found deficient. For example,
Congress might have been concerned with state restrictions on liability,
such as immunities to common law tort claims.'11 Or if the Congress of
1871 was mistrustful of state courts chiefly in race-relations cases, courts
might allow consideration of the availability of state remedies for some
constitutional claims but not for others.
In part because Monroe's discussion of the role of alternative remedies was incomplete,' 19 other courts, less sympathetic to a generous con117 Id. at 173-85.
118 Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
394-95 (1971) (relying in part on differences between state tort law and direct actions under
the Constitution to justify implying direct actions under the Constitution).
119 Questions about the role ofalternative remedies long have plagued the Court's analy-
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struction of section 1983, have been able to use the availability of state
remedies as a justification for limiting its reach. Although the Court has
formally adhered to Monroe by not requiring exhaustion of state judicial
remedies in section 1983 cases, on other issues the Court has relied on
state remedies to curtail section 1983's scope. The Court in Pierson v.
Ray' 20 casually mentioned that corrections of errors on appeal was part
of the basis for granting absolute judicial immunity. In Imbler v.
Pachman,121 the Court pointed to criminal sanctions and bar association
disciplinary procedures as alternative remedies to support the grant of
absolute immunity to prosecutors. O'Shea v. Littleton 122 relied in part on
the availability of other remedies to deny systemic injunctive relief
against a city's criminal justice system. And in Ingraham v. Wright 23 and
Parratt v. Taylor,124 the Court relied on the availability of state remedies
to restrict the scope of section 1983, by restricting the content of the
Constitution. 125
sis of civil rights matters lying outside the boundaries of § 1983. In the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court relied on the theoretical availability of state remedies as a basis
for stating that civil rights "cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority ....
[An individual's] rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress." Id. at 17. Thus, the
state action doctrine can be viewed in part as an offshoot of the Court's assumption (although
unrealistic in the context of the Civil Rights Cases) about available alternative remedies.
In actions against federal officials, the Court at least recently has had much less faith in
the efficacy of state remedies. Here the Court seems unwilling to assume the effectiveness of
state remedies even when they may be fully available. For example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court implied a
damages action for violations of the fourth amendment. One approach to the question
whether the Court should imply such a remedy would be to allow such actions only when
state law provides no effective remedy. Justice Brennan's opinion in Bivens demonstrates that
state tort law will not always provide suitable remedies for fourth amendment violations, but
it makes no effort to show that state law would not provide an effective remedy on the facts of
Bivens. For other instances in which alternative remedies figure in the Court's civil rights
decisionmaking, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2705-06 (1982); Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (relevance of Federal Tort Claims Act remedy to the availability of
a Bivens action); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (relying on various other remedies to justify denial of civil rights removal). See generall T. EISENBERG, supra
note 39, at 167, 225-26, 303, 335, 340, 369 (1981).
120 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
121
424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
122 414 U.S. 488, 502-03 (1974). In O'Shea, the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief
required analysis of alternative remedies. Traditional equitable principles require consideration of the adequacy of other remedies before granting injunctive relief. For incisive discussion of this requirement's application to civil rights cases, see 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
INJUNCTION (1978); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1153-54 (1977).
123 430 U.S. 651, 676-78, 683 (1977).
124 451 U.S. 527, 541-44 (1981).
125
In Ingraham, the Court relied on "the safeguards that are available under applicable
Florida law" to find that corporal punishment was not a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. 430 U.S. at 676. In Parrall, the Court relied in part on Nebraska's having
provided the plaintiff "with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation" to
conclude that negligent loss of a prisoner's property did not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. 451 U.S. at 543.
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The Supreme Court, from Monroe to Parratt, has never weighed
carefully the relative scope and effectiveness of the alternative state remedies. Monroe simply deemed those remedies irrelevant. The ability to
correct errors on appeal, relied on in Pierson to help justify judicial immunity, does little for the litigant seeking damages for what may have
been malicious judicial deprivations of constitutional rights. Moreover,
criminal and professional sanctions against prosecutors are rare events;
they cannot be controlled by civil plaintiffs, and they provide no relief to
aggrieved victims. If Monroe failed to consider seriously the role of alternative remedies in the course of expanding section 1983, Pierson, Imbler,
and other cases turn the game around. In contracting section 1983, they
relied blindly on alternative remedies, offering equally incomplete
justifications.
E. Entity Immuniy
As is the case in other areas of immunity, the Court's discussions of
entity immunity too often reflect the weak features of Tenney and Monroe.
Essentially, they combine Monroe's abuse of legislative history with Tenney's neglect of historical context.
The entity immunity story begins in Monroe. In reviewing section
1983's legislative history, the Court pointed out that Congress rejected
an amendment proposed by Senator Sherman that would have made
the property of each citizen in a municipality, and that of the municipality itself, liable for specified misbehavior by anyone within the municipality.' 2 6 The Court interpreted this rejection as showing that
Congress did not intend municipalities to be covered by section 1983.127
Since the Sherman amendment did so much more than just make cities
liable for their own acts, it is impossible to support Monroe's conclusion
128
on the basis of the defeat of the Sherman amendment.
The Court confessed as much in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 129 but it again reached a faulty conclusion on the basis of Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment. The Monell Court
acknowledged that municipalities may be liable under section 1983 for
their own acts. 130 Turning to the question whether municipalities may
be liable under section 1983 merely because they employ misbehaving
subordinates, the Court concluded:
[Tihe language of § 1983, read against the background of the same
legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not in126
127
128

365 U.S. at 187-90.

Id. at 191-92.

For example, the Sherman amendment would have imposed liability on a municipality for acts by private persons not connected with the municipality. See id. at 187-90.
129 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
130 Id. at 683-90.
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tend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable sole'Y
because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality
13 1
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
As in Monroe, the Monell Court drew an unsupportable conclusion
from the rejection of the Sherman amendment. As proposed, the
amendment imposed two forms of liability that respondeatsuperior liability does not impose. First, the amendment would have imposed liability
1 32
for acts by all persons in the municipality, whether public or private.
Except in unusual cases, respondeat liability under section 1983 would not
make cities liable for private misbehavior. Second, the Sherman amend133
ment would have made both the city and private individuals liable.
Respondeat liability under section 1983, on the other hand, would not
impose liability on private individuals for misbehavior by public officials. Therefore, important features of the Sherman amendment, some
more extreme than respondeat liability, formed more likely bases for its
3
rejection.'

4

Tenne's contribution to the law of municipal immunity, and the
freedom that its historical technique provides the Court, emerged in two
subsequent entity immunity cases. In Quern v. Jordan,135 the Court considered whether section 1983 abrogates state immunity from suit in federal court. In light of the wording and background of section 1983, and
the Court's repeated acknowledgement of it as a symbol of the post-Civil
War revolution in federalism, 136 one easily could interpret section 1983
as manifesting such a congressional intent. Alternatively, the Court
might have followed Monell and found the language of section 1983 to
dictate state liability. In support, it could have noted that nothing in
the legislative history of section 1983 suggests a congressional decision to
immunize states from liability, 13 7 or it might have noted the absurdity of
Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 702-03 (Appendix to Court's opinion).
133 Id. Only one draft of the Sherman amendment made private persons liable. See id.
134
Despite Monell, cities remain vulnerable for some employee misbehavior. The guiding
rhetoric requires detection of official city policy-a concept of some elasticity. See, e.g.,
DeVasto v. Faherty, 658 F.2d 859, 866 (1st Cir. 1981) (city's "custom, policy and practice in
searching plaintiff's home" held constitutional); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224
(8th Cir. 1981) ("municipality's continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the type of informal policy or custom that is amenable to suit
under section 1983"); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1016 (1981) (implicit or tacit authorization may be official policy); Quinn v. Syracuse Model
Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 1980) (equating high executive behavior
with official policy).
135
440 U.S. 332 (1979).
136 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
137 See general Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978) (reviewing § 1983's legislative history); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-82 (1961) (same).
131
132
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distinguishing between states and political subdivisions of states for purposes of immunity under section 1983.138 The Quem Court, however, expressly relying on Tenne, concluded that Congress had not intended "by
the general language of [section 1983] to overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States."' 13 9 The Court had learned
the lesson of Tenney: Place a heavy enough burden on the statute and its
history and one always can support the status quo.
The second entity immunity decision--Owen v. City of Independence 1---severely strained this technique. The question presented in
Owen was whether municipalities enjoy the good faith defense available
to individual defendants under section 1983. The Court acknowledged
that at common law municipalities have enjoyed immunity for at least
some governmental functions.' 4 1 Given this concession, the Tenne technique requires an express statement by Congress abrogating the immunity. Instead, the Court stood Tenney's technique on its head:
[W]e can discern no "tradition so well grounded in history and reason" that would warrant the conclusion that in enacting § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act, the 42d Congress sub silentio extended to municipalities a qualified immunity based on the good faith of their officers.
Absent any clearer indication that Congress intended so to limit the
reach of a statute expressly designed to provide a "broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights," . . . we are unwilling to
suppose that injuries occasioned by a municipality's unconstitutional
conduct were not also meant to be fully redressable through its

sweep. 142
In Quern and Tenney, Congress had been required affirmatively to abrogate a pre-existing immunity. Now, the Court said, Congress must affirmatively grant immunities.
Taken together, Quem, Monell, and Owen have one other startling
feature. Because some states were playing the central role in the suppression of Blacks, state laws were express targets of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866143 and 1871.144 "States' rights" was the rallying cry for
Indeed, one might build a case from the legislative history to the effect that states, but not
municipalities, should be liable under § 1983. When provisions for municipal liability were
rejected, it was partly on the ground that states, not municipalities, were responsible for law
enforcement functions. See 436 U.S. at 668.
138 See generalgy Comment, The Denialof Eleventh Amendment Immunity to PoliticalSubdivisions
of the States: An Unjustified Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042 (suggesting that both
states and their political subdivisions should be immune).
139 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
140 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
141 Id. at 644-50.
142 Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
143
14 Stat. 27. See 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88: PART ONE 1224 (1971).
144 17 Stat. 13.
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resistance to Reconstruction and the federal civil rights program.1 45 Yet
in these three opinions the Court finds a congressional will to (1) leave
state immunity intact and (2) subject municipalities to new categories of
liability without the benefit of a good faith defense.
Quem also eliminated one possible defense of the Court's section
1983 results. Until Quern, anomalies in the Court's sovereign immunity
doctrine were a leading source of difficulty in section 1983 cases involving governmental entities. A nineteenth century sovereign immunity
case, Hans v. Louisiana,146 established the questionable and textually unsupportable rule that the eleventh amendment protects states from suits
by their own citizens. Lincoln County v. Luning, 147 another nineteenthcentury sovereign immunity case, held, with little supporting reasoning,
that cities and counties do not enjoy the protection of the eleventh
amendment. Hans and Lincoln Couny insulated from liability the entity
ultimately responsible for governmental failures "under color of" state
law and distinguished between the state and governmental entities that
exist as creatures of the state. With these holdings in place, there was
little chance that a sensible law of entity liability could develop under
section 1983.
Quem and circumstances offered the Court that slim chance. By the
time Quern was decided, the Court had established that Congress has
power to modify states' eleventh amendment immunity. 48 All the
Court need have found in Quem was a congressional desire to do so.
Finding such an intent seemed as supportable as not doing so.149 But the
Court's refusal to find the requisite intent added to section 1983 jurisprudence the anomalies of eleventh amendment doctrine.
This unfortunate marriage of section 1983 doctrine to eleventh
amendment doctrine yields a new anomaly. Prior to Quern, the Court
had detected in the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976150
the congressional mandate required to penetrate the eleventh amendment barrier. 151 Quern thus assures that when clients have suffered damages from constitutional violations by states, only their attorneys will
152
receive direct economic benefit from an action against the state.
145 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 354-65 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment).
146
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
147
133 U.S. 529 (1890).
148
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
149
See 440 U.S. at 354-65 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
15o
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980) (second sentence).
151
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978).
152
A generous interpretation of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act may lead to
tension in other areas. It remains an open question whether judicial immunity precludes
injunctive relief against judges. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S.,
446 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1980). At least some lower courts that allow injunctive actions against
judges allows attorney's fees to be awarded against them. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669,
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F. Section 1983 and the Civil Rights Movement
It is possible to highlight the weaknesses in Tenney and Monroe, identify those weaknesses as sources of confusion in later cases, and retain the
luxury of not determining whether stronger opinions in each case would
have made any difference. It is one thing to argue that the Court should
have considered fully the historical and constitutional context in which
section 1983 operates; it is quite another to decide whether the additional considerations would have translated into different results. Had
the Court taken into account the additional factors discussed above, it
might well have reached the same results. But one can also conceive of
circumstances in which public liability law might have taken strikingly
different turns.
Enacted in 1871 as part of the legislative program to assist the then
recently-freed Blacks, section 1983 barely had time to develop before the
Slaughterhouse Cases, the invention of the state action limitation, and a
generally narrow view of the Constitution's protection of individual
rights combined to deprive section 1983 of any significant constitutional
rights to which liability might be attached. If section 1983 had developed in the 1870s in the context of cases involving overt legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial hostility to Blacks-the very type of official
misbehavior that helped prompt its enactment-there would have been
great pressure to limit the availability of absolute immunity. The historical vision of section 1983 might have dominated, for the cases
brought to the Court would have provided powerful reminders of the
53
historical circumstances that led to section 1983's enactment.
When section 1983 began its modern doctrinal development, particularly in the Supreme Court's immunity cases, the development remained remarkably free of influence of the most important social force
of the time, the civil rights movement-the one force capable of generating cases that would remind the Court of section 1983's origins. That
54
movement reshaped many aspects of public law. .Dombrowskiv. Pftster,1
however temporarily, 155 opened the doors of federal courts to civil rights
workers. Griftin v. County School Board'5 6 seemed to support federal judi673 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 540 F. Supp. 772, 773
(E.D. Mo. 1982). Sealo Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 116,
96 Stat. 25 (allowing Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to pay federal judges' defense
costs); 67 A.B.A.J. 1248 (1981) (judges purchasing malpractice insurance).
153 Ironically, had § 1983 developed in the 1870s, it is unlikely that it would have survived. Most of the effective civil rights laws were repealed in 1894. See Act of Feb. 8, 1894,
ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36. By 1903, civil rights legislation had become so moribund that Justice
Holmes felt it necessary to articulate his assumption that § 1983 (Revised Statutes § 1979)
had not been repealed. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485 (1903). By playing dead, § 1983
lived to fight another day.
154 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965).
155 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47-54 (1971) (distinguishing Dombrowski).
156 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
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cial takeover of local taxation if necessary to avoid surrender to school
segregationists. Other aspects of public liability law, including part of
the sovereign immunity bastion,1 5 7 fell victim to the Court's commitment to school desegregation; the state action doctrine was stretched
near the breaking point. 158 Yet of all the Supreme Court's section 1983
immunity cases, only Pierson v. Ray' 59 was a civil rights movement case.
Even there, the police had acted mildly in comparison to official action
in other cases involving southern law enforcement. They had merely
arrested protesters; they had not hosed or beaten them. Given the doctrinal breakthroughs that the civil rights movement produced in other
areas, the right race case at the right time might have started a significant movement towards liability under section 1983. At a minimum, it
might have caused the Court to consider a two-tier system of liability
under section 1983. Cases raising racial equality issues directly related
to the issues that prompted section 1983's enactment would generate
narrow immunity rules. Cases involving other constitutional claims
would generate results resembling the current immunity structure.
The absence of civil rights movement cases from the Court's section
1983 docket may not have been accidental. Somewhere in its mass of
appeals and certiorari petitions there must have resided cases that would
have provided an opportunity to impose liability under appealing circumstances. The Court's program of racial equality, however, did not
require extraction of damages from wrongdoers. The injunction in its
many forms was the sword of the civil rights movement, 160 and its effectiveness was relatively unaffected by the immunity doctrines.
In fact, imposition of liability might have threatened successful
completion of the Court's civil rights agenda. In merely approving issuance of injunctions and reviewing criminal convictions, the courts provoked criticism. Many critics did not wait for the large scale
institutional cases of the 1970s' 6 ' to conclude that courts were going too
far in reshaping society. 162 Imposition of damages liability upon public
officials or entities might have fueled the flames of resistance and endangered public acceptance of the Court's program of racial equality. It
may not be coincidental that it was Governor Rhodes in Ohio in 1973,
rather than Governor Maddox in Georgia in the 1960s, who first learned
that governors may be liable under section 1983.163 However divided
the country was over Vietnam and the related Kent State shootings by
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
386 U.S. 547 (1967). See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
160 See generaly 0. Fiss, supra note 122.
161 See generaly Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinaqand the Exraordna,7in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1980).
157

158
159

162

See generaly A.

163

See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH

(1962).
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guardsmen under Governor Rhodes's ultimate command, the possible
imposition of liability upon him occurred after the sharpest conflicts
over Vietnam had subsided. More importantly, imposition of liability
upon him in the 1970s would not provide a potentially dangerous rallying point for resistance to the Court's decisions. Imposition of liability
upon a Southern governor in the 1960s would have done little to facilitate acceptance of the Court's racial equality decisions.
G. On Past and Future Weaknesses
Many sources have contributed to confusion in section 1983 litigation. Some of the difficulties have stemmed from analytical errors represented by Tenney's mindless use of history, while others have arisen from
misreading or distorted use of section 1983's history (as in Monroe) or
from the spread of doctrinal stains from related areas (as in the case of
sovereign immunity). The difficulties do not exhaust the list, but they
are among the more avoidable problems. Other problems, those caused
by section 1983's place in a federal system and its now established role as
constitutional enforcement mechanism, likely will prove less tractable.
Recent writings by Justices and commentators threaten to introduce a new basis for anomalous section 1983 decisionmaking. This new
basis does not purport to be tied to history in general, to section 1983's
history in particular, or to detailed analysis of cases or doctrines. Rather,
it consists of the assertion that section 1983 cases are overwhelming the
federal courts. To some, this assumed fact translates into a need for an
exhaustion of remedies requirement in section 1983 cases. 16 4 Others
view it as evidence that section 1983 has grown too large and must be
restricted. 165 The central vision is one that many critics share: There
are too many section 1983 cases.
This premise seems amenable to empirical verification and should
be carefully examined lest the Court add to the questionable set of
premises that have governed its section 1983 decisionmaking. Part II,
which analyzes empirical data about the operation of section 1983, commences the necessary examination. At least some of the evidence does
164 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2577 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting);
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationshtp Between the Federaland State Courts From the Perspective ofa
State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 815 (1981). Justice O'Connor also has
suggested that an exhaustion of state remedies requirement may reduce the judiciary's budgetary needs. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1982, at A28.
165 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (overburdened
courts are reason for narrowly construing § 1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 526
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying on the number of civil rights cases to support grant
of individual immunity); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (torrent of civil rights litigation justifies municipal immunity from
§ 1983 actions); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (docket congestion justifies abstention).
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not support the assumption that section 1983 overburdens the federal
docket.
II
THE

REALITY OF SECTION

1983

LITIGATION

One hardly can read about section 1983 without seeing a reference
to the overwhelming number of section 1983 cases. More importantly,
decisions have been, and may continue to be, influenced by impressions
about the number of such cases. 166 Recently enacted and proposed legislation rests in part on the premise that section 1983 cases are inundating the courts. 167 In a concurring opinion in Parrallv. Ta lor Justice

Powell offered the escalation of section 1983 suits as a reason to interpret
the statute as not encompassing merely negligent conduct. 168 Justice
(then Judge) O'Connor invoked the federal caseload increase as a reason
for Congress to curtail the use of section 1983.169 Other judges, many of
whom are sympathetic to federal protection of civil rights through section 1983, have noted both the number and scope of cases and have
supplied enough commentary on the section to suggest widespread judi0
cial concern.17
Commentators also display concern with the workings of section
1983. Reciting caseload statistics sometimes is implicit commentary
that the statute is out of hand. 17 1 Others expressly call for restricting the
scope of the statute to particular classes of cases narrower than those
166 I do not mean to suggest that concern about burdening the federal courts is the only
factor influencing debate about the role of § 1983.
167 Section 5 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94
-Stat. 349 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. IV 1980)) requires state prisoners
under certain circumstances to exhaust state administrative remedies before seeking relief
under § 1983. Part of the rationale for the Act was Congress's impression that prisoner suits
are "swamping our judges." S. REP. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1979). Hearings on
proposed amendments to § 1983 also reflect concern about the number of§ 1983 cases. Hearings, supra note 39, at 15 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
168 451 U.S. 527, 546, 553-54 & n.13 (1981); see note 165 supra. For other recent expressions of judicial concern about the volume and nature of § 1983 cases, see, e.g., Lewis v.
County of Lehigh, 516 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Sloan v. Southampton Correctional Center, 476 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Va. 1979); Aldisert, State Courts and Federalismin the
1980s.- Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 821, 822 (1981).
169 O'Connor, supra note 164, at 810.
170 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 16-17 (1973); Aldisert,JudidalExpansion of Federal.jurisdiction: A FederalJudge'sThoughts on Section 1983,and the
Federal Case Load, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER [currently ARIZ. ST. LJ.]557; Coffin,Justice and
Workability: Un Essat, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 567 (1971); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers.- Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers'Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447
(1978).
171
See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 (1973 & Supp. 1981); Cass, supra note 2, at
1159.
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classes it now encompasses.' 72 Even sympathetic critics mention the
173
burdens that section 1983 imposes on the federal courts.
In one respect, the shared concern about section 1983 is understandable. The oft-quoted statistics are, at least at first glance, startling:
Between 1961 and 1979, nonprisoner civil rights cases filed in federal
district courts increased from 296 to 13,168; 174 state prisoner filings in
federal courts showed a similar jump, increasing from 218 in 1966 to
11,195 in 1979.175 Maine v. Thiboutot's176 holding that section 1983 encompasses purely statutory claims may be a fertile source of new cases.
Of course, one should hesitate before relying on these numbers to
conclude that the volume of section 1983 cases raises an isolated problem. Several possible explanations exist for the growth of section 1983
litigation: increases in population, increases in the number of prisoners,
increases in the number of lawyers (or of lawyers willing to bring civil
rights cases), increases in the number of police, the expansion of constitutional rights, increased availability of attorneys' fees, and decreased
responsiveness of other branches of government. 177 To view the increase
in section 1983 cases as a problem demanding a remedy without understanding the cause of the increase may engender a cure that entails more
costs than benefits. Indeed, one may conclude that the growth is unavoidable, or even a positive development.
Even if the growth of civil rights litigation generates a prima facie
"problem" for the federal courts, raw numbers always tell an incomplete
story. To obtain a clearer picture of section 1983 in operation, I conducted a study of section 1983 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 in the Central District of California, which is located in and includes Los Angeles.
172 See Note, supra note 105; Note, Land Use Regulation, the FederalCourts, and the Abstention
Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134 (1980).
173 See Nahmod, The Mounting Attack on Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment, 67 A.B.A.J.
1586 (1981); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH..L. REV. 5, 6 (1980). See also Schuck,
supra note 2, at 283 n.2 (discussing limited nature of available data).
174
ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. OTs., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 6; ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. OTS., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 194. These reports

are based on July 1 to June 30 fiscal years.
Other compilations suggest similar increases in suits against the police. See Project, supra
note 73, at 781 n.3. Interestingly, in fiscal year 1980 the number of civil rights filings in U.S.
district courts fell to 12,944, a decline of 1.7% from fiscal 1979, but the 1981 figure rose to
15,419, an increase of 19.1% from 1980. ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. OTS., 1981 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 75. The 1978 figure also suggests a decline in the number of such
filings from 1977. Id. These statistics do not distinguish between civil rights cases brought
under § 1983 and civil rights cases brought under other civil rights statutes. See text accompanying notes 231-38 infra.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. OTS., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 61; AD175
MINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. OTS., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 207.
176 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
177

For an interesting effort to predict caseloads based on a variety of variables, see

Goldman, Hooper & Mahaffey, CaseloadForecastingModes for Federal.DistrictCourts, 5 J. LEGAL
STUD. 201 (1976).
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If the Los Angeles experience is representative, two major conclusions
emerge from the study. First, the sheer volume of section 1983 cases
poses no serious threat to the federal court system. Section 1983 cases
neither place unbearable burdens on the courts nor direct massive resources to relatively minor claims. Neither the number nor the nature of
section 1983 cases justifies major doctrinal change. Second, problems do
attend the operation of section 1983. There is evidence that courts
strain doctrine to dismiss section 1983 cases and that federal judges are
178
inhospitable to the clumsy pleadings of pro se litigants.
A.

Methodology

Because only a small proportion of section 1983 cases lead to published opinions, studies of this sort require examination of pleadings and
court records. In this study, student research assistants attempted to
gather detailed information on every section 1983 case filed during 1975
and 1976 in the Central District of California. For each such case, the
students compiled a factual summary of the basis for plaintiff's claims,
the relief sought, any defenses or immunities asserted by the defendants,
the name of the judge, the presence or absence of counsel, and a record
of all proceedings in the case. With a few exceptions, all the cases studied terminated prior to the time the data were analyzed. No general
effort was made to obtain information beyond that contained in the district court record.
At the outset, it should be noted that any study of this kind has
limitations. The study is incomplete, even as a picture of section 1983
litigation in Los Angeles. A more complete study would include analysis
of section 1983 cases brought in state court as well. 179 Even in the studied federal cases it is difficult to evaluate fully judicial performance, for
no effort was made to go beyond each case's written record. In addition
to monitoring certain indicia of the burden that the cases imposed on
the courts, the study can assess only those issues that emerge with some
clarity in the pleadings. Inartistic pleadings further complicate the
task. 180 Finally, the period studied may be more remote than one would
178 Professor Shapiro's study of habeas corpus in Massachusetts found similar problems.
Shapiro, FederalHabeas Corpus: 4 Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321 (1973).
179 Given the continuing debate about the need for access to federal courts (compare
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) with Bator, supra note 47), it
would seem valuable to compare the results of this study with a similar study of state court
§ 1983 cases.
180 There also are cases that will not show up in a study of § 1983 actions but that perhaps should be included. A plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional
state statute need not rely on § 1983 to state a cause of action. A direct action under the
Constitution in such cases can be traced back to Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). We
found at least one such case in this study. See Orrin W. Fox Co. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.,
Civ. No. 76-1200 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 13, 1976) (three-judge court) (complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, relies on the fourteenth amendment, but does not invoke § 1983),
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hope for in an ideal study. There have been significant changes in section 1983 doctrine since 1975 and 1976, some of which undoubtedly af18 1
fect the number of filings.
Still, one should not understate the study's relevance. The findings
concerning the nature and burden of section 1983 cases are consistent
with the few other empirical studies available.' 8 2 If Los Angeles does
not represent the national experience, it does illustrate the experience in
the great metropolitan areas, where a large portion of section 1983 litigation occurs.18 3 Perhaps one cannot claim that Los Angeles's mix of
White, Black, Hispanic, and Oriental communities is "typical," but few
cities lack some such mix.' 84 And Los Angeles does not have a police

department, such as Philadelphia's, that provokes truly extraordinary
rev'd, 439 U.S. 96 (1978). After enactment of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as the second sentence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (Supp. IV 1980)), which authorizes fees in cases brought against state officials under
§ 1983 but does not authorize fees in cases brought directly under the Constitution, a plaintiff
should include a § 1983 cause of action in a complaint seeking injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional behavior.
Mundane logistical problems also frustrate efforts to effect a complete study. For example, district court records reveal at least eight 1975 cases and ten 1976 cases that may have
been § 1983 cases but that were transferred to other jurisdictions. Complete records for these
cases were no longer available in Los Angeles. In addition, at least four 1975 and three 1976
cases, which may or may not be § 1983 cases, could not be completely analyzed because their
files were incomplete or unavailable. The docket sheets indicate that two of the 1975 cases
were dismissed, Palacio v. Pitchess, Civ. No. 75-2848 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 25, 1975); Simons
v. Kane, Civ. No. 75-918 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 13, 1975), one resulted in summary judgment
for the defendants, Re v. Todd, Civ. No. 75-1754 (C.D. Cal., filed May 23, 1975), and the
other resulted in a $1,000 judgment against a school official. Mann v. Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., Civ. No. 75-3745 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 3, 1977). Of the 1976 cases, the
docket sheets indicate that one was dismissed, Leslie v. Superior Court, Civ. No. 76-3629
(C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 23, 1976), one was disposed of by a combination of dismissal and summary judgment for defendants, Interstate Marina Dev. Co. v. California, Civ. No. 76-3270
(C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 19, 1976), and one was stayed pending outcome of a state court case.
Dayton Realty Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Civ. No. 76-1138 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 7,
1976). In each case, the complete file could be located neither in the district court nor in the
Federal Records Center in Laguna Niguel.
181 See general4' text accompanying note 197 infra.
182 See Bailey, The Realities ofPrisoners' Cases Under 42 USC § 1983:. A StatisticalSurvq in
the Northern District of Illinois 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 527 (1975); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A
Stud ofPrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the FederalCourts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979); Project,
supra note 73.
183
If measured in terms of number of filings, the Central District could be described as a
"moderate" district. In fiscal year 1976, it ranked 19th out of 95 districts in number of prisoner civil rights cases filed. Turner, supra note 182, at 658-60. But its ranking slipped to 66th
by fiscal year 1978. Id. at 659. In fiscal year 1976, the Central District ranked 68th in the
total number of civil cases filed, ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS., MANAGEMENT STATISTICS
FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 1976, at 103 [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT STATISTICS
19761; in fiscal year 1977, it ranked 64th, ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS., MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 1977, at 103 [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS 1977].
184 For a comparison of the Central District of California's demographic characteristics
with those of five other districts, see Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the
Pace of Civil Litigation in Federaland State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 99 (1981).
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citizen and government reaction which might be expected to distort the
picture presented by civil rights cases. 185 Nor should one be too apologetic about the period studied. Many of the most interesting and timeconsuming section 1983 cases take more than a few years to complete. A
study that does not cover a period at least four or five years old risks
classifying as "pending" too great a proportion of the significant cases.
More importantly, 1975 and 1976 are relied on today as being among
the years in which the number of section 1983 filings showed increases
18 6
that should be of concern.
The study also encountered problems of categorization. How does
one decide which cases count as section 1983 cases? In many instances,
this determination may be evident from the complaint; often, however,
cases involve multiple claims, of which a section 1983 claim is but one.
The study counts as a section 1983 case any case in which a section 1983
claim has been made, even if the plaintiff has erroneously relied on section 1983 (as when suing only private parties). This sort of error did not
occur frequently enough to change the thrust of the results.
B.

The Burdens of Section 1983 Litzigation

There is no standard method by which to measure the workload
generated by a particular group of cases. One crude measure is whether
the case resulted in a trial. By this standard, section 1983 cases are not
very burdensome. In nonprisoner cases filed in 1976, only ten of 136
cases progressed to trial; 8 7 in 1975, only seven of 140 cases did so. 188
The number of trials, however, understates the burden; a case that has
received much litigant and judicial attention may be settled on the eve
of trial, or the critical issue may be a legal question that obviates the
need for a trial. A more sensitive measure of the burden imposed by
section 1983 cases should take account of other factors.
Another method of assessing the burden of section 1983 cases is to
determine the extent to which courts conduct hearings. In 1976, 37 of
136 cases led to some form of hearing. 189 In 1975, the numbers were 39
of 140.190 A third method measures simultaneously the burden of section 1983 cases on both courts and defendants. Cases in which defend185 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F.
Supp. 1248 (E.D. Pa. 1979), afd, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
186 See authorities cited at notes 165, 168, 171-73 sup ra.
187 Appendix, Table II. For the classification convention adopted in cases involving multiple defendants, see note 215 infa.
188 Appendix, Table I. About six percent of the nonprisoner § 1983 cases filed in the
years 1975-1976 led to trial. Review of a sample of Central District civil cases terminated in
1978 revealed a similar percentage of trials. See Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal,
supra note 184, at 106 (Table 6).
189 Appendix, Table IV.
190 Appendix, Table III.
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ants do not file answers usually impose no major burden on the system
or the defendants. In 1976, defendants filed answers in 69 of 136
cases, 19' and in 1975 defendants filed answers in 76 of 140 cases. 19 2 A
further measure of the burden on litigants may be gleaned from the
papers that they push. In 1976, district court records reveal depositions
in 26 of 136 cases and interrogatories in 41 cases.' 93 In 1975, 30 of 140
94
cases show depositions and 51 show interrogatories.1
Some observers find the potential financial burden that section
1983 imposes on municipal and other official defendants as troublesome
as the workload that section 1983 creates. For example, in Owen v. City of
Independence, Justice Powell's dissenting opinion expressly relies on this
fear to justify granting municipalities a good faith defense to section
1983 claims.' 9 5 The 1975-1976 Los Angeles experience provides evidence of the past financial drain caused by section 1983. The study
cannot, however, provide a complete picture of the financial burden
that is borne by section 1983 defendants, in part because most cases in
this study were completed prior to several recent decisions that will have
an uncertain net effect on official liability. Although Owen, Monell, and
Maine v. Thiboutot will tend to increase liability, other decisions, such as
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,' 96 Lake Couniq Estates, and part of Butz v. Economou,
will have the opposite effect.' 9 7 In addition, some settled cases in this
study do not reveal the terms of settlement and some cases dismissed on
plaintiffs' requests or by stipulation undoubtedly were the subject of
out-of-court settlements not reflected in the district court records.
The available information suggests that there is not a large-scale
shift of public funds to section 1983 plaintiffs. Plaintiffs achieved some
'9'

192

Appendix, Table IV.
Appendix, Table III. It should be noted that some cases generate substantial activity

at the pre-answer stage.
193 Appendix, Table IV. Most discovery takes place without an entry appearing in the
district court records. Usually only contested discovery matters will appear on docket sheets.
This severely limits the utility of the discovery figures in this, and in most other, studies.
194 Appendix, Table III. In many cases, litigants filed depositions and served interrogatories as well. Such cases appear in both deposition and interrogatory statistics. In comparison, a study of Central District civil cases terminated in 1978 found at least one discovery
event in 39.1% of the cases. Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, supra note 184, at 108
(Table 7).
195 445 U.S. 622, 670 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist made a similar
point in dissent in Monell. 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978). Recent hearings on proposed amendments to § 1983 emphasized the fiscal effects of civil rights litigation. Hearings, supra note 39,
at 1 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 40 (statement of Prof. Abernathy); id. at 74-75 (statement of Mr. Bates); id. at 516 (statement of Sen. Domenici). See also note 212 infia.
196 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
197 See notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra. Harlow makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome the good faith defense of executive officials. 102 S. Ct. at 2737-39. Lake
County Estates extends absolute legislative immunity to certain unelected regional officials, see
text accompanying notes 88-89 supra, and Butz v. Economou extends absolute judicial and
prosecutorial immunity to certain administrative agency officials. 438 U.S. at 508-17.
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measure of success-victory after trial, 198 settlement, injunctive relief,

summary judgment, or dismissal by stipulation (which often reflects a
settlement)-in 83 of the 276 cases, 1 99 and some of the settlements involved nonmonetary relief. In cases not involving employment discrimination claims, the settlements whose terms were revealed involved
00

2
relatively minor amounts.

Including employment discrimination cases in section 1983 statistics would overstate the burden imposed by section 1983. Title VII
claims, which often are brought in the same proceeding as section 1983
employment discrimination claims, overshadow the section 1983 claims.
Gngs v. Duke Power Co. 201 held that a Title VII plaintiff need not prove
intent to discriminate to establish a Title VII violation. Washington v.
Davis20 2 requires that an intent to discriminate be shown in section 1983
discrimination cases based on the fourteenth amendment. Thus, since
1972, when Congress extended Title VII to public employers,2 0 3 it has
been substantially easier to win a public employment discrimination
case under Title VII than under section 1983. When litigants proceed
under Title VII and section 1983, Title VII generates greater pressure
Plaintiffs prevailed in five of the 17 trials shown in Tables I and II of the Appendix.
Appendix, Tables I & II; note 198 supra. In cases in which the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed district court dispositions adverse to plaintiffs, the plaintiffs may
still obtain some relief. See Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1981); Lutcher v. Musicians
Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1981); Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935
(9th Cir. 1980); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979). In at least three cases,
higher tribunals overturned initial district court determinations favorable to plaintiffs. See
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir.
1981); Manney v. Cabell, 654 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, some of the 19 cases
dismissed by plaintiffs may have been settled.
200 Garcia v. Armstrong, Civ. No. 75-2975 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1978) ($1,500); Acierno v.
Gorman, Civ. No. 76-2182 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 16, 1978) ($6,250); Ochoa v. Simpson, Civ. No.
76-1278 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1977) ($2,500); Nasser v. Coast Community College Dist., Civ.
No. 76-615 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1977) ($2,250); Cherry v. Arnett, Civ. No. 75-2881 (C.D. Cal.
May 3, 1977) (undetermined future cost of compliance); Swain v. Hemple, Civ. No. 76-624
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1977) ($500); Garduno v. Effinger, Civ. No. 75-1874 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
1977) ($999); Cruz v. Berglund, Civ. No. 75-3640 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1977) ($2,500); Chavez
v. Piazza, Civ. No. 75-30 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1976) ($2,000); Kerr v. Adler, Civ. No. 75-2199
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1976) ($1,500). See also Gonzales v. McCuen, Civ. No. 76-3519 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 4, 1982) (nominal damages; $26,400 in fees awarded to plaintiff's attorneys). [Unless
indicated as the date of filing, the dates included in the unpublished cases in this Article refer
to the date of the most recent significant disposition by the court (usually dismissal).].
The largest financial drain may stem from institutional cases in which no direct money
damages are awarded, but substantial costs nevertheless may be incurred to comply with
judicially mandated changes. See text accompanying notes 292-305 inra. A Connecticut
study of § 1983 police cases found "infrequent and diminutive" damage awards and settlements for "modest sums." Project, supra note 73, at 813. See also note 212 infra. Indirect costs
such as city attorneys' salaries should also be considered. Seegeneral4y Hearings,supra note 39, at
151, 587 (testimony about defense costs in § 1983 litigation).
201 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
202 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
203 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
198
199

U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. III 1979)).
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on defendants than does section 1983. Indeed, employment discrimination cases comprise only about ten percent of the cases filed and generated nearly twenty percent of the cases in which section 1983 plaintiffs
obtained any relief.20 4 Even including these Title VII cases, money payments of any kind were reported in fewer than twenty cases, 20 5 although
again it is reasonable to assume that unreported settlements would increase this figure.
There are two exceptions to the pattern of little or no financial recovery for section 1983 plaintiffs. In Rivera v. City of Riverside,20 6 a jury
awarded approximately $33,000 to nine Chicano plaintiffs based on
gross misbehavior by the Riverside Police Department. 20 7 In Smiddy v.
Vamey, 20 8 plaintiff recovered $250,000 in damages for being arrested
without probable cause and for intentional concealment of exculpatory
evidence. 20 9 The court of appeals affirmed the finding of liability, but
204 Appendix, Tables I & II.
205 See cases cited in note 200 supra (monetary settlements in nonemployment actions);
Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 901 (1978), on
remand, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ($15,000 back pay awarded after trial in employment action), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, Civ. No. 754223 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1979), remanded, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978) ($39,000 back pay
awarded after trial); Lancaster v. California State Personnel Bd., Civ. No. 75-1890 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 23, 1977) (summary judgment for $28,000 plus fees in employment action). In addition,
several reported settlements of employment cases included monetary payments. Smith v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., Civ. No. 75-3257 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 1977) ($4,500) (probably not
a true § 1983 case); Humphreys v. St. Michaels Prep. High School, Civ. No. 76-1677 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 22, 1977) ($2,000); Parrish v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, Civ. No. 76-1494 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 1976) ($2,335); Martinez v. County of Ventura, Civ. No. 75-2075 (C.D. Cal. May
24, 1976) ($3,366 in fees); Sterling v. Los Angeles County Unified School Dist., Civ. No. 75185 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1976) ($2,370 plus fees). Two police misconduct cases resulted in substantial monetary judgments after trial. See notes 206, 208 infta.
206 Civ. No. 76-1803 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 1981) (consolidated on Oct. 8, 1976 with Alfaro v.
City of Riverside, Civ. No. 76-1901 (C.D. Cal., filed June 14, 1976)). Viewed in light of the
jury's findings for plaintiffs, the Rivera facts were as follows: a large number of police officers,
using tear gas, physical force, and racial epithets, broke up an innocent party. In the course
of doing so, the police drew their weapons, all but destroyed the dwelling they entered, and
inflicted physical harm upon plaintiffs. See Complaint, Rivera v. City of Riverside, Civ. No.
76-1803 (C.D. Cal., filed June 4, 1976). In related state court proceedings, a California municipal court found that the police had acted without probable cause. Id.
207 To some degree, the $33,000 figure presents an inflated picture of the monetary
award in Rivera. In fact, there were a series of minor awards to nine plaintiffs against six
defendants. The highest single award was for $3,000 and the total of all awards was $33,300.
See Rivera v. City of Riverside, Civ. No. 76-1803 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 1981) (order granting
judgment). Plaintiffs also were awarded approximately $245,000 in attorneys' fees, id., and
the defendant chose to appeal only the fees award, which was affirmed. See Rivera v. City of
Riverside, 679 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1982),petitionforcert. filed, 51 U.S.L. W. 3201 (U.S. Sept. 28,
1982).
208 Civ. No. 76-3390 (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 20, 1976), a.f'd in part and vacatedin part, 665
F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982).
209 The damages were recovered from Los Angeles homicide detectives and a polygraph
examiner. The detective defendants had arrested the plaintiff on charges of first-degree murder. The complaint alleges that the defendants had acted with malice, held the plaintiff
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strongly hinted that the damages award should be substantially reduced. 2 10 Given their facts, 2 1 ' and with the Smiddy award likely to be
modified, neither case involves an excessive recovery by plaintiffs.
Taken together, the two cases do not alter one's general impression
2 12
about the impact of section 1983 litigation.
It is somewhat misleading even to speak of section 1983 cases filed
by prisoners as burdening federal courts. In 1975, prisoners filed 125
section 1983 complaints. Fourteen prompted answers, three led to hearings of various types, four generated depositions, twelve generated interrogatories, and three led to trial. 2 13 In 1976, eighty-seven cases led to
eleven answers, seven hearings, one deposition, seven sets of interrogatowithout probable cause, and then concealed evidence that demonstrated the plaintiff's innocence. A lengthy trial resulted in findings of no probable cause to arrest and of other defects
in the homicide investigation. 665 F.2d at 265.
210 Id. at 266-68 (suggesting that plaintiff should not receive damages for most of the
period for which damages had been awarded).
211 See notes 206, 209 supra.
212 Other reported substantial recoveries under § 1983 also suggest major breakdowns in
law enforcement or other governmental functions. See, e.g., Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2233 (1982); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1981); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981); S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS &
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 4.04-4.12 (1979 & Supp. 1980). But I have not made any
systematic effort to analyze the results of § 1983 cases outside the Central District of California.
The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) seems to have made the
greatest effort to quantify the fiscal effects of § 1983 litigation. A 1981 survey by NIMLO
revealed nearly five billion dollars in pending claims against 215 municipalities. Hearings,
supra note 39, at 86 (NIMLO statement). By a rough process of extrapolation, NIMLO then
estimated that $780 billion in § 1983 claims were pending against all local governments in the
United States. Id. at 87 n.18. The validity of relying on amounts claimed, rather than
amounts recovered, to measure the fiscal impact of § 1983 litigation is, of course, highly suspect. Id. at 49 (statement of Prof. Steinglass).
NIMLO's own data supports a less apocalyptic view of the fiscal impact of § 1983 litigation. One of the questions on a NIMLO questionnaire sent to local governments asked the
respondent to "[list the amount of Section 1983 judgments and settlements against your
municipality and its officials for the recent past, both in dollar amount, and expressed as a
percentage of amounts originally claimed." Id. at 155 (Exhibit A to NIMLO statement).
Thirty-seven responses to the questionnaire were submitted to Congress. Of the 37 responding
local governments, 22 reported no judgments or settlements in excess of one dollar, 10 others
reported judgments or settlements totalling less than $10,000, two reported judgments or settlements totalling between $10,000 and $25,000, and two reported judgments or settlements
totalling between $25,000 and $50,000. Id. at 155-251 (responses to NIMLO questionnaire).
As reproduced in the published hearings, Indianapolis, Indiana, appears to have reported a
judgment or settlement of $20 million. Id. at 221. When I asked the city's Corporation Counsel for further information about the case, however, his office reported that there must have
been some sort of typographical error in the response or on the questionnaire. The city reported that total settlements and judgments against all city agencies have not exceeded
$400,000 in any of the last five years. Letter from Keith Kehlbeck, Administrative Assistant
to the Corporation Counsel, to Theodore Eisenberg (May 26, 1982).
It should be noted that there are reports of damages awards that threaten serious
financial difficulty for a few small municipalities. See N.Y. Times, May 30, 1982, § 1, at 21,
col. 1.
213 Appendix, Table V. Other studies of prisoner § 1983 cases reveal similar results. See
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ries, and one settlement. 214 The remaining prisoner cases were dismissed 2 15 on the basis of magistrates' reports and recommendations,
following what appeared to be pro forma review by a district judge.
What picture emerges of the burden of section 1983 cases? First,
the sheer numbers are hardly overwhelming. In 1975-1976, the Central
District of California had sixteen judgeships. 216 With a total of 488 prisoner and nonprisoner filings, the section 1983 cases constituted fifteen
cases per judge per calendar year. By comparison, in fiscal year 1977,
21 7 of
the Central District received a total of 377 filings per judgeship,
21
8
In fiscal year 1976, it received 369
which 279 were civil actions.
filings per judgeship, 2 19 of which 260 were civil. 220 If one assumes ap-

proximately 373 total filings per judgeship per calendar year and 270
civil filings per judgeship per calendar year, the section 1983 cases comprise 4.02% of all cases filed in the Central District and 5.56% of all civil
cases filed there. But even these figures may be heavily discounted. If
one discounts the figures to take account of cases in which no answer is
filed and cases that are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the burden of
section 1983 cases in the Central District seems within tolerable
limits. 22 1

Another way to estimate the burden imposed by section 1983 cases
is to compare it to the burden imposed by other classes of cases. DifferBailey, supra note 182, at 531-36; Turner, supra note 182, at 661-63. For a cautionary note
about the utility of the deposition and interrogatory figures, see note 193 supra.
214 Appendix, Table V.
215 In both prisoner and nonprisoner cases, a problem arises as to when to classify a case
as having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. Most filings encompass one or more plaintiffs bringing cases against many defendants. A civil rights plaintiff may, for example, name
as defendants individual police officers, their supervisors, the police department, the city, and
the state. In almost all cases, some defendants were dismissed relatively early. This study
classifies a case's disposition by the result least favorable to the defendants. Thus, a § 1983
case in which four defendants achieve dismissal on the pleadings and one defendant must
stand trial is classified as a case disposed of at trial-a classification which avoids understating
the success rate of § 1983 actions. It seems reasonable to assume that most plaintiffs view a
civil rights case as successful when they achieve a substantial settlement or judgment against
one defendant, regardless of the number of defendants originally named in the complaint.
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1977, supra note 183, at 103.
216
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1976, supra note 183, at 103.
220 Id. By comparison, in fiscal year 1976, the California superior courts reported 1,283
filings per judgeship of which approximately 1,138 were original, civil, non-habeas corpus
filings. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMIN. OFF. CAL. CTS. 196,
198 (1977) (Tables XVI & XVII). In fiscal year 1976, the State of Maryland reported 1,068
civil filings per judgeship, ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. OF THE CTS., MARYLAND, ANNUAL REPORT 1975-1976, at 80, and the State of Illinois reported 5,746 filings per judgeship in calendar year 1976. ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. OF THE ILLINOIS CTS., 1976 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, at 113 (not distinguishing between civil and criminal filings).
221 Similar conclusions have been reached in studies of prisoner cases. See Bailey, supra
note 182, at 544-47 (studying cases in the Northern District of Illinois); Turner, supra note
182, at 637, 662 (national study).
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ences in data bases and information-gathering techniques, however,
make even superficially valid comparisons hard to find and of modest
statistical value. Unlike this study, few studies follow to completion all
cases filed in a particular year. Most statistical case collections merely
provide information as to what happens to cases during a particular
year without regard to filing date. Nevertheless, the comparisons may
be of some value and, for the moment, they are all we have.
When the relative burden is measured by the percent of filed cases
that go to some form of trial, the Central District's section 1983 cases
probably are substantially less burdensome than civil cases filed in California's superior courts, the principal state courts of general jurisdiction.
In fiscal year 1976, trials of some form occurred in about forty-eight
percent of the total number of cases heard in superior court.222 The
corresponding figure for section 1983 cases must be substantially
lower.2 23 Another pair of numbers suggests a similar pattern: In fiscal
year 1976, cases dismissed for lack of prosecution comprised less than
1.5% of the civil cases filed in superior court, 224 while of cases filed in the
Central District in calendar years 1975 and 1976, twelve percent of the
2 25
nonprisoner section 1983 cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution.
The pace of litigation is another measure of the burden of section
1983 cases. By this measure, section 1983 cases seem slightly more burdensome than some other cases. A study of a sample of Central District
civil cases terminated in 1978 found that 55.1% had lasted more than six
months, 31.8% more than twelve months, and 11.3% more than twentyfour months. 226 Of the nonprisoner section 1983 cases commenced in
222

NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN-

NUAL REPORT, 1976, at 169. Almost two-thirds of all cases disposed of in superior court in
fiscal year 1976 required a jury trial or a court hearing. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., Supra

note 220, at 202. In fiscal year 1976, Maryland reports that trials accounted for 18.3% of all
dispositions in law cases, with jury trials accounting for approximately one-third of those
cases disposed of by trial. ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. OF THE CTS., MARYLAND, supra note 220,
at 87. In another study, however, in a sample of cases terminated in 1978, only 3.2% of all
cases in the Downtown Branch of Los Angeles Superior Court went to trial. Grossman,
Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, supra note 184, at 106 (Table 6). The disparity between the
1978 Los Angeles figures and the 1976 California figures increases skepticism about relying on
statistics too hastily to reach conclusions about the nature of litigation.
Another comparison demonstrates the flexibility of the numbers in this area. If one
measures the burden of litigation by the occurrence ofjuU , trials rather than by the number of
trials of any kind, the impression of the burden of § 1983 changes drastically. In fiscal year
1976, jury trials occurred in cases comprising less than one percent of the total number of
cases filed in California's superior courts. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CTS., supra, at 198.
Given the relatively small number of § 1983 trials, jury trials in only two or three cases would
make § 1983 appear to lead to proportionately more jury trials than California's state civil
litigation.
223 Appendix, Tables I & II. The Tables show that only 17 of over 270 nonprisoner cases
filed in 1975-1976 led to a trial.
224 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CTS., supra note 222, at 169.
225 Appendix, Tables I & II.
226 Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, supra note 184, at 95 (Table 3a). The 1978

1982]

SECTION 1.983

calendar years 1975-1976, 65.6% lasted more than six months, 40.6%
227
more than twelve months, and 17.0% more than twenty-four months.
A more direct comparison between section 1983 cases and civil cases
generally reveals a similar pattern. Court management statistics for
fiscal year 1976 indicate that the median time for disposition for all civil
cases in the Central District was seven months. 228 The nonprisoner section 1983 cases found in this study had a median disposition time of
229
eight months.
C.

The Actual Number of Section 1983 Cases

A final problem attends relying on the number of section 1983 cases
as a reason for reshaping civil rights doctrine. The simple fact is that we
have no idea how many section 1983 cases are filed in the nation each
year. The present study of the Los Angeles experience suggests that the
number of cases is only a fraction of what many of us have believed.
Nearly all widely-quoted national data on the effect of section 1983
on the federal court workload stems from information gathered by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. As some commentators note, the data on "civil rights" cases do not distinguish between
cases filed under section 1983 and cases filed under other civil rights
provisions. 230 For the reasons that follow, an educated guess would be
that section 1983 cases constitute only about one-third, and certainly
not more than one-half, of the cases the Administrative Office classifies
as civil rights cases.
Although statistical data on civil rights cases published by the Administrative Office is presented on a fiscal year basis, that Office was
able to furnish us with a computer tape containing its data for nonprisoner and prisoner civil rights cases filed in the Central District in
calendar years 1975 and 1976. The data show, for 1975 and 1976 respectively, 313 and 368 total nonprisoner civil rights cases, broken down
into subcategories as follows:
study excluded cases defined as "too large" or "too small," and it imposed other limitations
that restrict its utility for present purposes. Id. at 97-98.
227 Appendix, Table VIII.
228

MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1976, supra note 183, at 103.

229 This figure ignores activity after initial disposition by the district court. In fact, the
median disposition time varied widely between 1975 and 1976. For calendar year 1975, the
median time was approximately seven months; for calendar year 1976, it was nearly ten
months.
230 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 950 n.3;
Schuck, supra note 2, at 283 n.2; Whitman, supra note 173, at 6 n.9. See also ADMINISTRATIVE
OFF. U.S. CTS., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-14 (1979) (containing subjectmatter breakdown of "civil rights" actions). Examination of any recent subject-matter breakdown of civil rights cases indicates that employment claims constitute a huge fraction of all
civil rights cases. See, e.g., id. Moreover, actions against private employers could not be
§ 1983 cases and actions against public employers often are not "true" § 1983 cases. See text
accompanying notes 201-05 supra.
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A
23 1

Civil Rzghts Filings in the Central Dist'ict of California
Calendar Year
1975

Calendar Year
1976

172
187
Other Civil Rights
0
1
Voting
120
162
Jobs
18
16
Accommodations
1
4
Welfare
313
368
Totals
In comparison, our study found 140 nonprisoner section 1983 cases in
1975 and 136 such cases in 1976. Most of the discrepancy between the
Administrative Office's figure for total civil rights cases and our figures
for section 1983 cases can be explained by the fact that many civil rights
cases are filed under some provision other than section 1983. Not all
cases that the Administrative Office includes in the "other Civil Rights"
category are section 1983 cases. The "other Civil Rights" category seems
to include, in addition to section 1983 cases, similar cases against federal
defendants, 232 housing discrimination cases based on Title VIII,233 cases
based on section 1985,234 cases brought under section 1981,235 and some
236
miscellaneous claims.
In the Administrative Office categories other than the "other Civil
Rights" category, only job discrimination claims generated a substantial
number of civil rights filings. But the vast majority of these filings are
not based on section 1983. In the course of looking for section 1983
cases, our study detected many Title VII cases. Even though we did not
systematically search for such cases, Title VII seemed to generate at
least as many cases as section 1983. Because the purpose of the study
encompassed only Title VII cases that were also section 1983 cases, we
did not dig deeper at the time. When one adds the number of nonsection 1983 "other Civil Rights" cases filed to the number of private Title
231

Computer Tape No. 177, Filings for 1975 & 1976 in Central California Civil Rights

Cases (furnished by Administrative Off. U.S. Cts).
232

ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS., STATISTICAL CODES FOR CIVIL REPORTS SUB-

MITrED BY CLERKS OF COURT 1 (1980).

233 See Brooks v. Chris, Civ. No. 76-2962 (C.D. Cal., filed Sept. 17, 1976) (housing cases
classified on computer printout as "other Civil Rights" cases); Durns v. Hill, Civ. No. 76-731
(C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 4, 1976).
234 See Flannigan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Civ. No. 76-1113 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 6,
1976) (§ 1985 cases classified on the computer printout as "other Civil Rights" cases); Cox v.
Sieroty, Civ. No. 76-137 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 13, 1976).
235 See Destefano v. Ringsby United, Civ. No. 76-253 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 21, 1976)
(§ 1981 case classified on the computer printout as "other Civil Rights" case).
236 See UN Teachers v. Los Angeles, Civ. No. 76-1672 (C.D. Cal., filed June 2, 1976)
(miscellaneous claims classified on the computer printout as "other Civil Rights" cases); Leffier v. Anastaci, Civ. No. 76-1052 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 30, 1976).
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VII claims, most of the differences between the Administrative Office's
2 37
statistics and this study's findings disappear.
Employment cases, most of which are brought under Title VII,
have played such a significant role in the growth of civil rights litigation
that they deserve special mention. As the figures from the Administrative Office in Table A and the results of this study suggest, there are
about as many employment discrimination cases filed in Los Angeles as
there are section 1983 cases. On a nationwide basis for fiscal years 1973
through 1981, nearly sixty percent of the increase in all civil rights case
filings is attributable solely to the growth of employment discrimination
cases. 2 38 The central role of Title VII cases also suggests that critics of
section 1983 have used civil rights statistics in an oversimplified manner.
Commentators often point to the growth of civil rights cases by relying
on a comparison between 1960 or 1961 and some recent year. 239 Because
there were no Title VII cases nor virtually any other civil rights cases
against private parties in the early 1960s, it is questionable whether
these are appropriate base years for the purpose of comparison with
more recent years. To the extent that the recital of statistics is meant to
237 Of course, part of the discrepancy between the Administrative Office's "total civil
rights" figures and the number of § 1983 cases that we found may be attributable to our
failure to detect every § 1983 case filed in the Central District in calendar years 1975 and
1976. Although we probably missed some § 1983 cases, for the reasons that follow it is unlikely that we missed enough to change the overall impression of§ 1983 cases in Los Angeles.
Although some overlap exists with other subcategories, the vast majority of nonemployment § 1983 cases are included in the Administrative Office's "other Civil Rights" subcategory. To help assure the study's completeness, I obtained copies of the complaint and the
docket entries for each "other Civil Rights" case listed on the Administrative Office's computer printout (except those that contained federal defendants) that was not found in our
case-by-case search or by other means. These cases were then incorporated into the study.
This checking process assures that virtually every nonemployment § 1983 case included in the
Administrative Office's civil rights statistics is included in the study. I did not obtain copies of
the complaint and docket entries for "other Civil Rights" cases that the Administrative Office's computer printout indicated involved a federal defendant because these cases rarely are
§ 1983 cases. This means that § 1983 cases that were brought against state and federal officials, that were classified by the Administrative Office as being against a federal defendant,
and that were not found in our own case-by-case search of the district court files are not
included in the study.
For prisoner civil rights cases, the computer printout revealed 135 cases with no federal
defendant for 1975 and 88 such cases for 1976. Our study found 125 prisoner § 1983 cases in
1975 and 87 such cases in 1976. Because the Administrative Office does not distinguish between prisoner § 1983 cases and other civil rights actions filed by prisoners, the study's findings seem reasonably complete. A few cases that the Administrative Office characterized as
prisoner cases were classified in our study as nonprisoner cases, and a few cases classified by us
as prisoner cases were classified by the Administrative Office as nonprisoner cases, but the
discrepancies are small enough to leave the basic conclusions intact.
238 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 75.
239 See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 39, at 559 (statement of Mr. Wilkinson); id. at 587 (statement of Mr. Edmisten); id. at 599 (statement of Mr. Hink); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 39, at 950 n.3; T. EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 74.
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suggest something about the growth of section 1983, use of 1961 as a
base year is misleading.
In short, the Administrative Office statistics for the total number of
civil rights cases cannot be used indiscriminately to measure the number
of, or long-term growth of, section 1983 cases. Dividing the Administrative Office's figure by two, or even three, probably would yield a more
240
accurate estimate of the number of section 1983 cases.
D.

The Nature of Section 1983 Cases

Many judges appear concerned about the nature as well as the
number of section 1983 cases. Usually willing to acknowledge the need
for a federal remedy in what they consider important cases, they balk at
the application of section 1983 to cases in which they detect little or no
federal interest. Thus in Parrattv. Taylor, Justice Powell objected to constitutional law being trivialized,2 4 ' a theme echoed in the lower
242
courts.
This attitude stems from several factors. First, section 1983 has
been interpreted since Monroe to contain no internal limitations on the
types of constitutional claims that may be brought under it. It is, therefore, natural to assume that every conceivable federal claim finds its way
into court with the aid of section 1983. Second, those concerned about
the character of section 1983 litigation draw support from uncritical reliance on the numbers. Somehow the volume of section 1983 litigation
translates into use of section 1983 to bring the "wrong" kind of case.
Unwilling to look behind these numbers, the judge needs only slight
anecdotal evidence to conclude that section 1983 is a source of abuse.
The evidence may consist of a case or two of his own in which federal
interests seemed minor, or courthouse scuttlebutt may suffice.
The Los Angeles cases examined in this study suggest that this perception of section 1983 is flawed. On their surfaces, a large majority of
the nonprisoner section 1983 complaints asserted important interests.
Of the 276 nonprisoner cases, 117 alleged unlawful arrest, assault or battery by the police, and/or unlawful search and seizure.2 43 Another
240 Doubts about the number of § 1983 cases may lead some to recharacterize the concern about caseloads as encompassing all civil rights cases rather than just § 1983 cases. This
would seem to require added analysis of the desirability of Title VII cases and other non§ 1983 actions supported by civil rights statutes. To date, however, the concern about
caseload rarely is phrased in such a discriminating fashion.
241
451 U.S. at 554 n. 13. See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 39, at 233 (Supp. 1981).
242 See note 168 supra.
Appendix, Tables I & II. These categories of police misconduct cases contain a degree
243
of arbitrariness. Many plaintiffs allege combinations of misbehavior that overlap categories
such as "false arrest" or "assault." I have tried to categorize these cases by the "essence" of
the complaints. If the three major subcategories of police misconduct cases (false arrest, assault and battery, and unlawful search and seizure) are grouped together, no distortion is

SECTION 1983
twenty-four cases alleged malicious prosecution or judicial error in earlier proceedings. 244 Plaintiffs in twenty-one cases asserted first amendment violations and forty-six charged employment discrimination or
some other form of discrimination.2 45 Challenges to the constitutionality of ordinances, statutes, or similar policies (a category that overlaps
with other categories) arose in eighteen cases. 246 Thirty-three cases involved due process claims and twenty-seven fell into the inevitable "miscellaneous" category. 247 Even within the due process and miscellaneous
categories, where one might expect bizarre-sounding applications of section 1983, there were relatively few claims involving no significant federal interest. 248 Within the limits of what one may glean from
complaints, the general picture is clear: The vast majority of nonprisoner section 1983 cases involve classic rights of obvious importance;
the trivial claims are a sideshow.
Looking beyond the face of the complaint to ascertain more about
the nature of section 1983 cases reinforces the conclusion that section
1983 cases usually involve important constitutional claims. The litigants and courts take most seriously those cases involving deprivation of
rights by the police. The 117 police misconduct cases generated thirtythree settlements or trials and nineteen dismissals by stipulation. 249 Excluding employment discrimination cases as not raising true section
1983 claims, 250 the 130 cases not involving police misconduct generated

seventeen settlements or trials and eight dismissals by stipulation, a
"success" rate less that half that of police misconduct cases. 25 '
Section 1983 prisoner cases are more difficult to assess than nonprisoner cases. The complaints are often difficult to comprehend and in
a large majority of cases the records terminated with the filing of the
complaints, making it difficult to determine the seriousness of the
claims. Nevertheless, the study provides some sense of the nature of section 1983 prisoner litigation. Not surprisingly, prisoners' claims reflect
three principal concerns: the circumstances leading to incarceration, the
introduced by deeming a case to be an "assault" case when it also may be viewed as a "false
arrest" case.
244
245

Id.
Id.

See notes 263-64 infra.
Appendix, Tables I & II.
Those that seemed frivolous include Johnson v. California, Civ. No. 76-2107 (C.D.
Cal., filed July 1, 1976); Bennet v. County of Ventura, Civ. No. 76-1984 (C.D. Cal., filed Sept.
29, 1976) (miscellaneous claims dismissed due to incomprehensible pleadings).
249
Appendix, Tables I & II. This assumes that dismissals by stipulation reflect the existence of out-of-court settlements. In the District of Connecticut from 1970 through 1977,
plaintiffs achieved trial, settlement, or dismissal by stipulation in 73 of 89 closed cases. Project, supra note 73, at 790 (Table I). Twenty-three of the trials resulted in verdicts for the
defendant. Id.
250 See notes 201-09 and accompanying text supra.
251
Appendix, Tables I & II.
246

247
248
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conditions of incarceration, and proceedings relating to termination of
imprisonment. More than one-fifth of the cases involved attacks on
some aspect of the legal proceedings that led to incarcerations. 252 Almost one-half of the cases raised questions about treatment or discipline
in prison, with claims of medical mistreatment comprising the largest
single category of claims. 253 Some aspect of parole or probation deci254
sionmaking was contested in another thirteen percent of the cases.
Ten percent of the complaints asserted undue restrictions on access to
court.

255

As is true of nonprisoner cases, most prisoner section 1983 complaints were not plainly trivial assertions implicating little or no federal
interest. The largest and perhaps most controversial class of claims, that
involving prison conditions, has generated too much serious litigation to
dismiss as being of little federal interest. Indeed, in three Central District federal institutional cases courts found constitutional flaws in many
of the prison practices that most inmates challenge on a piecemeal basis.256 Claims involving the circumstances leading to incarceration or the
conditions of release assert wrongful deprivations of freedom. Most such
allegations may, if litigated, prove unfounded, but the cases rarely progress far enough to allow confident conclusions about their merits. The
ultimate truth or falsity of allegations in section 1983 cases, however, is
not yet a debated issue. The issue is the nature and volume of these
cases.

E. JudicialPerformance in Section 1983 Cases
So much discussion about section 1983 focuses on numbers that less
quantifiable features often are overlooked. Although constantly bombarded with citations to the number of civil rights cases, we are told
relatively little about those cases. The Los Angeles experience suggests
more than that section 1983 is used mainly to assert important federal
claims; that experience can also be used to assess the quality of judicial
treatment of section 1983 cases.
Few shocking failures of justice leap out from the case records.
With some exceptions, courts consistently provide at least arguable theoretical justification for their actions. Of course, given the array of immunities upon which courts may rely, it is not difficult to find a
Appendix, Table VI.
Id.
Id.
Id.
256 See Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (Los Angeles County
Central Jail conditions); Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (Orange County
Jail conditions). See also Manney v. Cabell, 654 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1980) (ordering district
court to abstain from hearing action challenging conditions at Central Juvenile Hall in Los
Angeles).
252
253
254
255
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doctrinal basis for dismissing nearly any section 1983 action. Nevertheless, the cases leave an impression of less-than-satisfactory performance.
The principal problem appears to be more one of attitude than of gross
misapplication of doctrine. On the many issues where a judge's discretion is determinative, unarticulated attitudes are more important than
precedent; and on such issues judges seem unsympathetic to civil rights
plaintiffs. One's impression is that courts are looking for ways to dismiss
cases-the only question is how to do so. To illustrate this concern, it is
helpful to focus on areas in which judicial discretion plays a central role.
1. Abstention
Both the nature of abstention and the Supreme Court's vague and
sometimes conflicting guidelines in the area 25 7 leave much of the abstention decision to the district judge's discretion. To justify abstention
under the Court's decision in RailroadCommission v. Pullman Co., 258 a case
must present an unclear question of state law that, once resolved, may
eliminate the need to decide a federal constitutional issue. Early in the
litigation the judge must predict the issues upon which he believes the
case will turn. If his prediction reveals a particular combination of state
and federal issues, abstention is possible. Because so much turns on the
judge's view of the case, Pullman abstention offers federal courts the
sometimes irresistible opportunity to decline to hear cases they do not
wish to hear. Within limits, Younger v. Harris,259 which prohibits federal
court interference with certain state proceedings, furthers this opportunity. At least one commentator has suggested 260 that a review of published cases raises doubts about federal judges' knowledge or candor in
applying these doctrines. The unreported Los Angeles cases in this
study provide further cause for concern about the spirit in which federal
courts apply the abstention doctrines.
The raw figures on the incidence of Pullman and Younger abstention
are not alarming. Of the 276 nonprisoner civil rights cases filed in 19751976, Los Angeles federal judges abstained or relied on abstention like
considerations in only thirteen cases. 261 However, in cases involving at257

See C. WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER

& E.

COOPER,

17

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4242, at 459-60 (1978); Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 602-04
(1977).
258 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
259 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
260 See Field, supra note 257, at 602.
261 Varguas v. McAnally Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 75-3599 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered
Dec. 29, 1975; dismissed Sept. 1, 1979); Lampel v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 76-2454
(C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Mar. 14, 1977; dismissed Oct. 25, 1977); Newport Invs., Inc. v.
City of Laguna Beach, Civ. No. 76-1514 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1977), afd,564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1977); Mission Hills Ranch, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, Civ. No. 76-2111 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 1976); Wilken v. Jones, Civ. No. 76-2311 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1976); Butker v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Civ. No. 76-1627 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1976); Family
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tacks on statutes, ordinances, or similar official policies-the primary
class of cases in which abstention is a serious possibility 262-courts seem
to be straining to abstain. In 1975-1976, Los Angeles federal judges
were presented with eighteen such challenges, eleven of which plaintiffs
pursued seriously. 263 Others either were not pursued by plaintiffs or

were dismissed without prejudice or at plaintiff's request. 264 Of the
eleven cases that were pursued seriously, one was settled, 265 three others
offered virtually no ground for Pullman or Younger abstention, 26 6 and one
Food Servs., Inc. v. Stoutt, Civ. No. 75-3370 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1975); Robin v. Davis, Civ.
No. 75-3523 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Oct. 21, 1975; dismissed Nov. 11, 1975). See also
Rivera v. State Bar of Cal., Civ. No. 76-2655 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1978) (challenge to state bar
disciplinary proceedings); Hollywood Fox Club v. Davis, Civ. No. 75-4215 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22,
1977) (federal proceedings stayed while plaintiff pursued similar action in state court); Ripston v. Pitchess, Civ. No. 75-3549 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1976) (refusal to limit courtroom security measures imposed by judge presiding in state criminal trial of third parties); Adams v.
Wiley, Civ. No. 75-3050 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1975) (child custody matters should be referred
to state courts); Krain v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Civ. No. 75-2271 (C.D. Cal. July 3,
1975), aft, No. 75-2853 (9th Cir. July 17, 1978) (abstention proper where plaintiff initially
filed in state court and later brought essentially same action in federal court). Some cases in
which courts relied on abstention-like considerations did not result in formal abstention.
Hence, only 11 of the cases cited in this footnote appear in Tables I and II as cases disposed of
by "abstention."
262 See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 257, § 4242, at 453.
263 Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 901
(1978), on remand, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1980), reva, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); Lampel v.
County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 76-2454 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Mar. 14, 1977; dismissed Oct. 25, 1977); Citizens Legal Defense Alliance, Inc. v. Mathews, Civ. No. 76-1614
(C.D. Cal. June 28, 1977), aft'd, 610 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1979) (consolidated wtih Zaslewsky v.
Board of Educ., Civ. No. 76-2472 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 3, 1976), afd, 610 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1979)); Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, Civ. No. 76-1514 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4,
1977), aft'd, 564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977); Corby v. Brone, Civ. No. 73-3319 (C.D. Cal. July
11, 1977); Dubois v. Department of Water & Power, Civ. No. 76-1031 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
1976); Mission Hills Ranch, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, Civ. No. 76-2111 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 1976); Wilken v. Jones, Civ. No. 76-2311 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1976); Butker v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Civ. No. 76-1627 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 1976); Goodell
v. California Interscholastic Fed'n, Civ. No. 75-2919 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1976); Rohm v.
Davis, Civ. No. 75-3523 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Oct. 21, 1975; dismissed Nov. 11,
1975).
264 See, e.g., Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Calfornia, Civ. No. 76-2889 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 7, 1977); Niyyi v. Superior Court, Civ. No. 76-4063 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 1977); Citizens
Legal Defense Alliance, Inc. v. California, Civ. No. 76-3195 (C.D. Cal., motion to dismiss
denied Jan. 28, 1977); Baktapriya v. Trusel, Civ. No. 76-3304 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 22, 1976);
California Divorce League v. Van de Camp., Civ. No. 76-1039 (C.D. Cal., dismissed on res
judicata grounds July 23, 1976); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rucker, Civ. No. 76-1843 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 1976); Halford v. SiIlas, Civ. No. 76-0636 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 22, 1976).
265 Goodell v. California Interscholastic Fed'n, Civ. No. 75-2919 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23,
1976).
266 Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 901
(1978), on remand, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1980), reo'd, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982) (challenge to
state statute requiring peace officers to be United States citizens); Citizens Legal Defense
Alliance, Inc. v. Mathews, Civ. No. 76-1614 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1977) (challenge to school
board rules pertaining to the assignment of teachers to achieve racial balance); DuBois v.
Department of Water & Power, Civ. No. 76-1031 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1976) (challenge to city
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went to trial despite a possible basis for Pullman abstention. 2 67 In each of
the remaining six cases, abstention was ordered. In none of the cases
was abstention clearly mandated and in some it seemed erroneous. Although the sample is too small to support firm conclusions, the results
warrant careful monitoring of judicial performance in this area.
Courts abstained in three cases attacking land use controls. 268
None of the judges in these cases specified the unclear question of state
law that supported abstention. 269 Whether or not the failure to so speccharter provision mandating retirement at age 65). In each case, neither the docket entries
nor the defendants' answers indicate that the defendants requested the court to abstain. See
Defendant's Answer to First Complaint As Modified, Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp.
158 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Answer to Complaint, Citizens Legal Defense Alliance, Inc. v. Mathews, Civ. No. 76-1614 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1977); id. (Answer to First Amended and Supplemental Complaint); Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Relief Preliminary Injunction and
Damages, Violation of Civil Rights, DuBois v. Department of Water & Power, Civ. No. 761031 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1976).
267
Corby v. Brone, Civ. No. 76-3319 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 1977) (constitutional attack on
statute and resolution limiting public employee participation in employee organizations).
268 Lampel v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 76-2454 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered
Mar. 14, 1977; dismissed Oct. 25, 1977); Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, Civ.
No. 76-1514 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1977), afd, 564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977); Mission Hills Ranch,
Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, Civ. No. 76-2111 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1976).
269 See Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1977);
Mission Hills Ranch, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, Civ. No. 76-2111 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 1976). In Mission Hills Ranch, however, the defendants did present a detailed, colorable
case for abstention. See id. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Abstain From the Exercise of Jurisdiction (filed Aug. 18, 1976)). The judge indicated orally
that zoning matters should be decided initially by the state court, a view that may have been
influenced by the plaintiff's concurrent filing of a state court action. Letter from Royal M.
Sorensen, counsel for the plaintiff, to Theodore Eisenberg (dated Dec. 4, 1981) (on file with
the CornellLaw Review). The state court proceeding was settled. Id. In Lampel v. County of
Los Angeles, Civ. No. 76-2454 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Mar. 14, 1977; dismissed Oct.
25, 1977), the defendants argued only that land use is a matter ofstate and local concern and
never specified the crucial unclear question of state law. See id. (Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 16-17 (filed Aug. 31, 1976)). The Magistrate's Proposed Report injected into
the case state law issues that neither party had raised, and it did so in a summary fashion
without supplying the slightest evidence that the state law claims raised by the magistrate
were sufficiently unclear to offer plaintiffs any significant chance of success in state court:
Government Code § 6500 et seq. provides authority for municipal governments to enact ordinances such as the parking ordinances involved in this
case. It is entirely possible that the state courts could conclude that the parkin& ordinances in question were not adopted in compliance with the provisions of the Government Code. Moreover, since the California Constitution
contains both a due process and equal protection clause . . . it is entirely
possible that the California courts will conclude that the ordinances in question are violative of one or both of these state constitutional provisions. ...
The third test, i.e., that the "possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful" also appears to be satisfied. Thus, the Magistrate has been unable to
discover any state court decision, and none has been called to his attention,
interpreting the ordinances in question. It seems to the Magistrate that it
would be prudent for this Court to afford the state courts the first opportunity
to interpret these ordinances.
Id. (Proposed Report and Recommendation As to Civil Rights Complaint 10-11 (filed Apr.
14, 1977)). Strangely, the magistrate failed to look for decisions interpreting the government
code and the state constitution-the very provisions that he found sufficiently unclear to be
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ify amounts to reversible error 27° -the doctrine leaves much to the district court's discretion-failing to identify the unclear issue of state law
undermines much of the rationale for Pullman abstention. If the state
court that hears the case does not resolve the issue that relates to the
federal constitutional question,2 7 1 the entire abstention process becomes
a waste. The failure to specify unclear questions of state law suggests
that federal judges lack familiarity with the abstention doctrine or that
their eagerness to dispose of cases outweighs any legitimate effort to adhere to established doctrine.
The fourth and fifth abstention cases involved challenges to allegedly overbroad ordinances regulating nude entertainment. 2 72 Attacks
on such ordinances often are poor candidates for abstention, for state
courts are unlikely to be able to resolve in the course of a single proceeding the first amendment problems that attend such statutes. Where a
series of clarifying state cases may be necessary to resolve the state issue,
the Supreme Court has indicated that abstention should be disfavored. 273 Yet in one of the Los Angeles cases the judge strained to find
an unclear question of state law, 2 74 and in the other the court merely
potentially dispositive of plaintiffs' claims. Ironically, in a case clearly falling within federal
jurisdictional grants, the magistrate suggested to the plaintiffs that "federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction and that litigants suffer many different kinds of grievances which cannot or should not be tried in the federal courts, at least at the time the litigants desire them to
be tried." Id. at 12. The couit, following the magistrate's recommendation, ordered abstention pending resolution in state court of state-law issues. See id. (Magistrate's Final Report
and Recommendation (filed Apr. 14, 1977)); id. (Judgment entered Apr. 18, 1977).
For discussions of the propriety of abstaining from land use cases under Colorado River
Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) or Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943), see Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2270 (1982); Note, supra note 155.
270 See Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1977) (no
error).
271 The much-heralded certification procedure, whereby states provide a relatively efficient method for deciding state law issues in Pu//man abstention cases (see, e.g., FLA. APP. R.
461), is unworkable unless the federal court specifies with precision the unclear question of
state law it deems necessary to avoid deciding the federal constitutional question. Seegeneral(v
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 257, § 4248. But see Newport Invs., Inc. v.
City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d at 895 ("[S]tate courts are fully capable of making a proper
determination of the particular issues that they should undertake. . . to resolve.").
272 Wilken v. Jones, Civ. No. 76-2311 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1976); Rohm v. Davis, Civ. No.
75-3523 (C.D. Cal., abstention ordered Oct. 21, 1975; dismissed Nov. 11, 1975).
273 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
378 (1964); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 257, § 4242, at 461; Developments
in the Law, supra note 102, at 1255. A contrary attitude seems inherent in the view, not
adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, that state courts should be given a "first
chance" to construe statutes attacked on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 557 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Vance v. Universal Amusement
Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
274 Wilken v. Jones, Civ. No. 76-2311 (C.D. Cal., abstention order entered Sept. 14,
1976). The court in Wilken stated that the challenged ordinance was "reasonably susceptible
to a construction which could cure its apparent overbreadth." Id. at 3 (Order of Abstention).
The ordinance prohibited the exposure of certain parts of the human body by any waiter,
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expressed the hope that a state court would find some limiting construction, without specifying the precise issue upon which it sought a clarify-

275
ing state ruling.

The sixth abstention case was dismissed pursuant to Younger v. Harris because a proceeding was pending before a state administrative
agency. 276 At the time, it was (and still may be) a serious, disputed

question as to which state administrative proceedings, if any, were covered by the Younger rule. 277 The district court dismissed the case without
278
alluding to the existence of the issue.

waitress, or entertainer in any establishment that serves food or beverages, with an exception
for any "theater, concert hall, or similar establishment which is primarily devoted to theatrical performance." Id. at 7 (quoting RIALTO, CAL. ORDINANCE 704, ch. 9.80.090 (1976)). The
court acknowledged that the plaintiff's establishment, a bar with entertainment, could not fit
the statute's definition of "theater." Straining a bit, it asserted that the plaintiff's establishment might fit within the exception as a "concert hall, or similar establishment which is
primarily devoted to theatrical performance," terms not defined by the ordinance. The same
argument undoubtedly could have been made concerning any establishment against which
the city sought to enforce the ordinance. If it is to be modified by the type of narrowing
construction suggested by the court, the ordinance cannot be so narrowed in a single state
proceeding; each establishment must be assessed on the facts of its own operation. This is
precisely the type of ordinance that the Court has suggested is not a prime candidate for
Pullman abstention. See note 273 and accompanying text supra.
275 Rohm v. Davis, Civ. No. 75-3523, slip op. at 1-2 (C.D. Cal., abstention order entered
Oct. 22, 1975); see notes 269-71 and accompanying text supra.
276 Butker v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Civ. No. 76-1627 (C.D. Cal.
June 16, 1976).
277 See S. NAHMOD, supra note 212, § 5.15, at 156-57 & n.161. Without so holding, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973), seems to assume that some but not all matters
pending before state administrative agencies are covered by the Younger rule. See generaly
Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Educ., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1981). In Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 2522 (1982), the Court found
Younger to be applicable to state bar disciplinary proceedings that (1) constitute state judicial
proceedings, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide adequate opportunity to
raise constitutional issues.
278 Butker v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Civ. No. 76-1627, slip op. at 2
(C.D. Cal. June 16, 1976) (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). The court's order
asserts that the state agency's action was a judicial proceeding, but the case relied on for that
proposition, Francisco Enters., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), merely states that
state law considers the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to be a state court of limited jurisdiction. 482 F.2d at 485. One would think that invocation of the Younger rule would
require an independent federal determination of whether pending proceedings are judicial in
nature. See generaly Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 102 S. Ct.
2515, 2522 (1982). In addition, the state cases that Kirby relies upon fall far short of establishing that, as a matter of state law, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control is to be
treated in all respects as a court. Kirby relies on two state cases, Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Bd., 52 Cal. 2d 238, 340 P.2d 1 (1959), and Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1946), in an effort to justify a particular standard of review
on appeal from the Department's decisions. Covert merely holds that the findings of the Department's predecessor agency are not subject to de novo review in superior court. 29 Cal. 2d
at 131, 173 P.2d at 548. Neither case suggests that the Department's proceedings are in all, or
even many, respects the equivalent of judicial proceedings. A court that is disinclined to
abstain would have had little difficulty in finding a stronger administrative than judicial tone
in the Department's activities.
Another use of Younger, not mandated by Supreme Court decisions, is its application to
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Although these six cases constitute a small sample, they raise questions about judicial attitudes towards cases asserting constitutional
2 79
rights and about judicial compliance with the oft-quoted statement
that abstention is the exception rather than the rule. Simple lack of
understanding of the abstention doctrines may be a partial explanation.
It would be unfortunate if such misapprehension led courts to err only
280
on the side of denying access to federal court.
2. Pleadings in Przoner Cases
Whether a prisoner's claim proceeds beyond the complaint stage
depends largely on the attitude with which the magistrate or district
judge views the complaint. Claims that are not frivolous on their facesand many are not-usually can be construed to allege facts that warrant
at least appointing counsel to develop the case. But upon investigation
so many prisoner claims prove weak that it is easy to lose objectivity in
assessing the merits of their allegations. The conscientious judge who
allows cases to proceed beyond the pleading stage may find the claims
fabricated or distorted. He then becomes less eager to allow future cases
damages claims. See Field, The UncertainNature of ederalJurisdicton,22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
683, 711-12 (1981). But cf. Fair Assessment In Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177
(1981) (comity precludes damages actions against administration of state taxes). Interestingly, the one prisoner case in the study that relied on Younger to dismiss a claim did so when
the plaintiffs had requested only damages. See Anderson v. Waters, Civ. No. 75-848 (C.D.
Cal., filed Mar. 7, 1975).
279 See, e.g., Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976); C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 257, § 4242, at 464.
280 In at least one case filed during the period covered by the study, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the district court erroneously refused to abstain. Manney v. Cabell, 654 F.2d 1280
(9th Cir. 1980). In Manney, plaintiffs attacked almost every condition of confinement at Central Juvenile Hall in Los Angeles, alleging violations of the California and federal constitutions and of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Id. at 1282. Although plaintiffs
failed to obtain relief on most of their claims, the district court found that the overcrowded,
unsanitary conditions and the medical-care system violated state and federal constitutional
standards and state statutory standards. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in finding that the
district court should have abstained, noted the presence of the two factors it found necessary
to justify Pulman abstention-a case involving a "sensitive area of social policy" and a potentially dispositive unclear issue of state law, id. at 1283-and vacated the district court's judgment. Id. at 1283-85.
Manney demonstrates the remarkable flexibility of the Pullman abstention doctrine. It is
difficult to point to any "clear error" in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. One might argue that
the added delay in a five-year old case was reason enough not to abstain, but Pullman abstention has extracted greater time sacrifices from litigants. Yet ifManngy is viewed as applying
Pullman correctly, it portends a major shift in the allocation of constitutional litigation between federal and state courts. The factors upon which Manney relies probably are present in
hundreds of institutional and school desegregation cases that have been litigated in federal
court without invoking Pullman abstention. State law, usually undeveloped, plays a role in
many institutional cases. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 161, at 487-88. State constitutional provisions undoubtedly apply to many forms of school desegregation and, in difficult
school desegregation cases, state law might well be deemed unclear. If the reasoning of Manney is correct, federal courts may have to decline to adjudicate a large class of cases that they
have been adjudicating for over two decades. The case seems to prove too much.
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to proceed, and his decisions dismissing cases rarely receive substantive
appellate review. Perhaps for these reasons, federal magistrates and
judges in Los Angeles appear to have become less than fully sensitive to
prisoner claims. Their inclination to resolve ambiguities in pleadings
against pro se litigants is the clearest outward manifestation of this
attitude.
The existence of some personal immunity is one common basis for
dismissing prisoner complaints.2 81 In the case of executive officials, including the police, the immunity consists of a good faith defense.2 82 As
the Supreme Court made clear in Gomez v. Toledo, 283 the defendant must
plead the good faith defense. A plaintiffs failure to allege facts that
negate the defense is not a basis for dismissing his claim. In about ten
percent of the cases, courts relied on the good faith defense or some
equivalent formulation in dismissing prisoner complaints, 28 4 but in
many of these cases the defendant did not even file a responsive pleading.2 85 Even when the good faith defense was pleaded correctly, at the
time these cases were decided it contained a subjective component that
required determining whether the defendant believed he acted constitutionally.28 6 This subjective standard, recently modified in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,287 made it unlikely that the defense should have prevailed solely
2 88
on the basis of allegations in pleadings.
The courts' attitude towards supervisory liability also suggests that
prisoners' pleadings receive less than sympathetic readings. A narrow
view of the pleadings will interpret an action against a wrongdoer's supervisor as an effort to hold the supervisor vicariously liable for the acts
of a subordinate. Few courts are willing to hold supervisors liable solely
because they have the right to supervise offending subordinates.2 89 A
narrow view of the pleadings therefore effectively terminates the action
against the supervisor. A generous view of the pro se pleadings, however, which seems required by the Supreme Court, 29° might sometimes
preclude such early dismissals of actions against supervisors. Even if supervisors are not liable solely because they have the right to supervise,
281 See Appendix, Table VII.
282 Se, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
283 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
284 Appendix, Table VII.
285 Appendix, Table V.
286 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). But cf. Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (summary judgment may be based on qualified immunity); Barker v.
Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981) (summary judgment proper after causes of
action and issues have been properly isolated).
102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737-39 (1982) (limiting subjective component of good faith defense).
287
288 Schuck, supra note 2, at 325-26.
289 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). See also note 99 supra.
290 Boag v. MacDougall, 102 S. Ct. 700 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972).
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they may be liable if the failure to supervise is negligent or if other factors establish a nonvicarious connection between the wrongdoer and his
supervisor. 291 A lawyer often should be able to allege sufficient supervisory involvement to survive dismissal on the pleadings of the case
agaisnt the supervisor. In a pro se complaint, a sympathetic court sometimes will detect such allegations. An unsympathetic court rarely will.
The Los Angeles courts never do.
3. Institutional Cases
No study of prisoner cases filed under section 1983 would be complete without mention of institutional prison cases in which federal
courts play a substantial role in overseeing state penal institutions. The
institutional cases raise important questions, but most of those questions
relate only tangentially to the issues analyzed here. Although few would
argue that institutional cases are overwhelming the courts, some view
them as involving federal courts too heavily in the details of prison administration. 292 Federal courts, the argument goes, assume tasks for
which they are poorly suited and impinge upon state and local government functions.
The 1975-1976 Los Angeles prisoner cases generated at least three
institutional cases. These cases reflect a willingness to influence state
institutions that is absent from the treatment of individual prisoner cases
in the Central District. But willingness should not be confused with eagerness. On their facts, the institutional cases fairly begged for some
relief. Moreover, the decisions reflect deference to the needs and status
293
of state officials.
The plaintiffs in one such case, Stewart v. Gates,294 challenged the
policies and practices of the administrators of the Orange County Jail.
After three years of litigation, the court, among other things, commended to the defendants "that they give consideration to the likeli291

See cases cited in note 99 supra.
Cf. Bator, supra note 52, at 635 (separating questions about federal constitutional litigation from questions about institutional litigation). Some criticisms generated by institutional litigation may apply to constitutional litigation on a broader scale. For example, the
concern that "trivial" claims are brought in federal court might apply to an institutional case
in which a court finds constitutional implications in the minutest details of institutional life.
It seems more likely, however, that this "trivialization" process may be attributed to factors
other than judicial nitpicking. See also Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 161, at 475-86.
293 See Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 105 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (denying request
for more space); id. at 110 (requesting further input from parties); id. at 111 (denying request
for increased length of visits); id. (announcing a goal rather than mandating a constitutional
minimum); id. at 112 (denying relief with respect to indoor recreation); id. (approving jail's
"trustie" system); id. at 114 (requesting that defendants propose a solution to holding-cell
problems); id. at 117 (refusing to second-guess certain disciplinary actions); Stewart v. Gates,
450 F. Supp. 583, 585 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (suggesting that defendants reevaluate mail examination policy); id. at 587 (recommending relaxation of limitation on photographs in cells).
294 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978), remanded, 618 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1980).
292
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hood, or at least the possibility, that, except in unusual circumstances,
outgoing mail need not be examined at all and that incoming mail
should be checked only for contraband. ' 295 In addition, it ordered substantial increases in telephone facilities; that each prisoner kept overnight be given a mattress and a bed or bunk upon which to sleep; that
prisoners be allowed to receive books, magazines, or newspapers through
the mail, subject to inspection; that prisoners be allowed at least fifteen
nxinutes to complete each meal; and that when in bed, inmates be permitted to cover themselves with blankets "provided that sufficient anatomy is exposed to establish the presence of a person. '296 Although the
conditions that generated these orders did not seem as inhumane as
those evidenced in some celebrated institutional cases, 29 7 more than half
of the inmates at the county jail are pre-trial detainees. 2 98 Three years of
litigation were needed to establish that people convicted of no crime
were entitled to a blanket at night and fifteen minutes in which to eat a
meal.
The plaintiffs in Rutherford v. Pitchess299 brought similar challenges
to the conditions of confinement at the Los Angeles County Central Jail.
Three years of proceedings before the same judge that heard Stewart revealed similar conditions and generated similar reliefE0 0 Most of the
inmates at the Los Angeles jail were pre-trial detainees.3 0 1 Manney v.
Cabell,3 0 2 which challenged almost every condition of confinement at
the Los Angeles Central Juvenile Hall, also followed the Rutherford/Stewart pattern. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court should have abstained pending determination by a
30 3
state court of the plaintiffs' state law claims.
Considering these cases in light of the treatment of individual prisoner cases in the Central District offers another perspective on the institutional cases. Institutional litigation, with all its real or imagined
difficulties, has clear advantages over individual lawsuits as a technique
Id. at 585.
Id. at 590.
297 See Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of aJudiczal Decree OrderingInstitutionalChange,
84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1349-50 & n.56 (1975).
298 See 450 F. Supp. at 585; letter from Terry Smerling, Esq., counsel for the plaintiffs, to
Theodore Eisenberg (Nov. 17, 1981) (on file with the ComlLaw Review).
299 457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
300 Id. at 108-18.
301
Id. at 108. As often occurs in institutional cases, the proceedings in Rutherford have
dragged on for years, and portions of it have yet to go to trial. See letter from Terry
Smerling, Esq., counsel for plaintiffs, to Theodore Eisenberg (Oct. 30, 1981) (on file with the
Comll Law Review). Both the plaintiffs' counsel and the district judge, however, have noted
an improvement in conditions at the Los Angeles County Central Jail. See id.; Rutherford v.
Pitchess, Civ. No. 75-4111 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1979) (Supplemental Memorandum of
Decision).
302 654 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1980).
303 Id. at 1285. See generally note 280 supra.
295
296

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:482

for dealing with objectionable institutional conditions. Individual lawsuits magnify the importance of prisoners' legal skills. Prisoners are
poorly positioned to develop the facts necessary to prove allegations, and
it is a rare prisoner who can draft complaints and supporting papers
that adequately address the relevant legal issues. Moreover, whether a
particular prisoner obtains relief will often turn on whether he is aggressive enough to file and successfully pursue a lawsuit. Without counsel,
his chances of doing so are minimal. Yet few prisoners can afford coun30 4
sel and federal courts rarely appoint counsel in prisoners' civil cases.
In short, individual suits failed in the Central District of California for
the reasons that they fail everywhere. Lost in a mass of complaints, the
meritorious claims receive the same assembly-line treatment as do all
other prisoner claims. The cost of having the system find the meritorious claims is high-a judge cannot order a full hearing in every prisoner's case.
By comparison, institutional litigation allows a single lawyer or
team of lawyers to serve an entire institution's population. The institutional approach offers the traditional advantages of class action litigation in a setting in which the class shares common interests and
grievances and is unable to obtain adequate individual representation.
Institutional cases thrive because many institutions have serious
problems and because the traditional alternative, litigation by individ30 5
ual prisoners, has been a failure.
CONCLUSION

It is ironic that so much discussion of official liability focuses on the
theory and reality of section 1983. Although all aspects of state officials'
liability for constitutional violations have developed under section 1983,
official liability doctrine need not have done so. A decade after Monroe v.
Pape, in Bivens v. Sx Unknown Named Agents ofthe FederalBureau ofNarcotics, 306 the Court faced the question whether an implied private damages
action exists to redress constitutional violations by federal officials. The
Court might have had to address the same question with respect to state
officials without finding definitive guidance in section 1983.
Section 1983 could have continued on its path of pre-Monroe obscurity. The Court might have adopted the historical perspective and limited section 1983 to a narrow class of race-related claims. Or, borrowing
from a line of analysis followed in Brown v. Board of Education,30 7 the
Court might have acknowledged that it could not turn back the clock to
1871 and deemed the gap between the intent of section 1983's enactors
See Appendix, Table V.
See also Turner, supra note 182, at 653-55 (recommending pattern or practice suits to
test prison conditions).
306
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
307
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
304
305

1982]

SECTION 1983

and modern problems too wide to construe section 1983 to address specific modern official liability issues. For whatever reason, a narrow reading of section 1983 would have required the Court to address the
question whether there is an implied private right of action to redress
constitutional violations by state officials.30 8 An affirmative answer
would have rendered section 1983 little more than a historical footnote.
All cases asserting constitutional violations would then have been Bivens
actions.
Would official liability law have developed differently if a Bivenstype case, rather than section 1983, were the prime moving force? One
immediate difference rests in the potential liberation from the guidance
the Court claims the legislative history of section 1983 offers. For example, under an implied right of action, the court would have had to face
the issues of municipal immunity and respondeat liability without misleading historical props.
More importantly, there might have been a shift in our way of
thinking about the law of constitutional remedy. Today, one can delude
oneself into thinking about the law of constitutional remedy as an abstraction distinct from the details of section 1983 doctrine. For example,
it is common to hear discussion of section 1983 cases as trivializing the
Constitution or overwhelming the federal courts. One may advocate restricting section 1983 without necessarily conceding a desire- to restrict
the Constitution. If section 1983 were eliminated as an intermediary
between constitutional violations and remedies for those violations, this
misleading mode of thought would become less tenable.
Interestingly, the current fascination with the number of section
1983 cases may contribute to the same misleading mode of thought
about the law of constitutional remedy. As long as attention focuses on
whether there are too many section 1983 cases, one need not focus on
the larger question of what the law of constitutional remedy should be.
If the crushing caseload that section 1983 is thought to generate turns
out not to be quite so crushing, those relying on the caseload to shape
section 1983 may reassess their views. For example, those who view the
number of section 1983 cases as justifying an exhaustion of remedies
requirement must reassess whether the same position can be supported
without relying on the numbers. Even if there are "too many" section
1983 cases, we would have to decide whether the attendant problems are
tolerable in light of the protections afforded constitutional rights. The
numbers game provides a convenient distraction from the underlying
issues.
The Court may yet have to decide this question. Lower courts sometimes find that
Bivens actions against city or state officials do not encounter the impediments to actions
brought under § 1983. See Rhodes v. City of Wichita, 516 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1981)
(respondeatsupen'or liability in Bivenr action against city; Monell held inapplicable).
308
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TABLE I
Disposition of Nonprisoner Section 1983 Cases: 1975

Cn

False Arrest

31

6

4

4

6

41

Assault, Battery, Shooting,
etc.

2

3

3

2

5

1

1

3

3

2

1

6

27

1117

Search, Seizure,
Harassment
Malicious Prosecution

I

1

117

2

judicial Error or
Misconduct

4

1 3

2

15

3

1

10

3

2

1

1

3

2

Tax Disputes

2

2

Child Custody

1

b

First Amendment Claims
Employment
Discrimination

2

1

17

3

Other Discrimination
Due Process

11

3

21

1

Miscellaneous
Totals

t17

117
7
110
4
3

3
35

3

1

9
6

1

17

a.

Includes one case that was later settled and is counted once in arriving at totals.

b.

Includes one case that was settled after trial commenced, was later dismissed by stipulation,

and is counted once in arriving at totals.
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TABLE II
Disposition of Nonprisoner Section 1983 Cases: 1976
C-

Fals Arest
Shooingetc.1
Haasmet0

5

8

5

7

2

4-

Jud9ia
or
False Arrest
Battery,
Assault,
Shooting,
etc.

2
1

Mo
5
5

5

Search, Seizure,
Harassment

1

2

4

2
12h
0~

2

212

2

8
7

1

04Ero
1

2
2

4

Malicious Prosecution

1

judicial Error or
Misconduct

3

12

3

2

1

Employment
Discrimination

3

3

2

3

2

1

2

1

1

1

10

1

1

3

11

2

6

19

45

6

Due Process

1.

5

1

23
21

12

First Amendment Claims

Other Discrimination

2

3

2

11

1

4

12
10

3

3b

23

1

18

9

136

Tax Disputes
Child Custody
Miscellaneous
Totals
a.
b.

10

21

Injunctive relief also granted.
Includes two cases in which partial relief (injunctive) was granted.
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TABLE III
Litigation Progress of Nonprisoner Section 1983 Cases: 1975
MaiiusPoecto

Fals Arest

2
0
A7

2 09

U

6
B:Fn0

0

~

r
5

11
3

11

0

0

C
2

False Arrest

27

20

6

5

Assault, Battery, Shooting, etc.

17

10

8

6 19

Search, Seizure, Harassment

17

9

2

4

Malicious Prosecution

4

2

1

judicial Error or Misconduct

15

3

2

First Amendment Claims

10

4

3

3

3

2

Employment Discrimination

17

14

8

7

9

1

7

4

1

1

3

2

1

2

2

Other Discrimination
Due Process

10

5 13

Tax Disputes

4

2 11

Child Custody

3

Miscellaneous

9

Totals

3

12

2

3

2

2
1

8

4

1

2

2

1

12

1

4
2

1

1

1

3

2

2

5

176 139 130

oas140

4

151 138

91

8

SECTION 1983

1982]

TABLE IV
Litigation Progress of Nonprisoner Section 1983 Cases: 1976
0:

0

Q

V,

00
-

C

False Arrest

23

12

5

5

6

3

5

2

Assault, Battery, Shooting, etc.

21

12

4

7

12

5

4

1

Search, Seizure, Harassment

12

9

3

2

4

1

Malicious Prosecution

2

2

1

1

1

Judicial Error or Misconduct

3

1

First Amendment Claims

11

5

5

1

2

Employment Discrimination

12

11

4

2

5

Other Discrimination

10

2

1

1

2

3

Due Process

23

7

10

5

5

7

1

3
1

1

2

1

3

3

1

Tax Disputes
Child Custody
Miscellaneous
Totals

1

1
18

8

136 1 69

4

3

4

8
3 114
110
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TABLE V
Litigation Progress and Disposition of Prisoner Section 1983
Cases Not Summarily Dismissed: 1975 & 1976
1975
125 Cases Filed

1976
87 Cases Filed

Settlement

0

1

Trial

3

0

Answer

14

11

Hearing

3

7

Deposition

4

1

12

7

Attorney Represented Prisoner

8

5

Pending or Unexplained

2

0

Interrogatories

SECTION 1983

1982]

TABLE VI
Nature of Prisoner Section 1983 Claims 1975 & 1976
1975
125 Cases Filed

1976
87 Cases Filed

guard harassment

9

3

medical treatment

Prison Conditions

18

10

withholding property

9

2

mistreatment by other inmates

3

3

searches

2

2

18

9

conditions generally

punishment, disciplinary proceedings

6

1

overcrowding

3

1

interference with mail

6

6

interference with religion

2

0

7

5

11

7

judicial, clerical, or prosecutorial misconduct

6

11

false testimony

1

4

Prior Legal Proceedings
legal representation
false arrest, assault, search & seizure

Parole, Probation, Sentencing, Detainers
22

6

detainers, transfer, or transport

6

7

sentencing practices or computation

3

3

miscellaneous release claims

6

1

Access to Courts

11

10

Miscellaneous Claims

13

13

matters pertaining to probation or parole
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TABLE VII
Common Bases for Dismissing Prisoner Section 1983 Claims:
1975 & 1976
1975
125 Cases Filed

1976
87 Cases Filed

Exhaustion of Remedies

15

8

Good Faith Defense

15

9

Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Immunity

15

5

7

10

Not Under Color of Law

15

6

No Cause of Action or No Constitutional
Violation

15

8

6

1

24

4

Res Judicata

2

1

Deference to Prison Officials

9

1

10

12

Statute of Limitations

3

1

Defective Pleadings

8

11

Municipal, Entity, or State Immunity

Prosecutorial Immunity
No Respondeat Superior Liability

Lack of Prosecution

TABLE VIII
Survival Rate of Nonprisoner Cases to Initial Final Disposition By District
Court (Figures Exclude Post-Appeal Dispositions)
Percentage of Cases Surviving
Time Elapsed From Initial Filing

1975

1976

1975-6

6 Months

70.7%

60.3%

65.6%

12 Months

42.9

38.2

40.6

18 Months

20.0

25.0

22.5

24 Months

15.0

19.1

17.0

13.2

10.5

30 Months

7.9

